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ABSTRACT

This work, consisting of three manuscripts, addresses natural resource management
under risk due to variation in climate and weather. In three distinct but theoretically
related applications, I quantify the role of natural resources in stabilizing economic
outcomes. Manuscript 1 examines policies for controlling the risk of outbreaks of
cyanobacteria, algae blooms, stimulated by excess nutrient loading transported by
uncertain and possibly changing rainfall patterns for a drinking water watershed in
Rhode Island. The manuscript is based on a paper co-authored with Jim Opaluch.
Manuscript 2 addresses welfare outcomes of optimal, as well as open access,
extraction of a groundwater resource when demand is variable based on precipitation
conditions. The groundwater stock is treated as depletable both in height and spatial
extent. The model is applied to the Ogallala aquifer in Kansas. The manuscript is
based on a paper co-authored with Todd Guilfoos. Manuscript 3 models the market
for natural gas used by the electric sector in New England as a function of weather and
pipeline capacity. The effect of changes in natural gas import capacity on natural gas
price and quantity consumed as a function of the severity of winter weather conditions
is quantified for the New England region.

In Manuscript 1, we address policy designed to effect the risk of cyanobacteria blooms
in a drinking water reservoir through watershed wide policy. Combining a hydrologic
and economic model for a watershed in Rhode Island, we solve for the efficient
allocation of best management practices (BMPs) on livestock pastures to meet a

monthly risk-based as well as mean-based water quality objective. In order to solve for
the efficient allocations of nutrient control effort, we optimize a probabilistically
constrained integer-programming problem representing the choices made on each farm
and the resultant conditions that support cyanobacteria blooms. In doing so, we
employ a genetic algorithm (GA). We hypothesize that management based on
controlling the upper tail of the probability distribution of phosphorus loading implies
different efficient management actions as compared to controlling mean loading. We
find a shift to more intense effort on fewer acres when a probabilistic objective is
specified with cost savings of meeting risk levels of up to 25% over mean loading
based policies. Additionally, we illustrate the relative cost effectiveness of various
policies designed to meet this risk-based objective.

Rainfall and the subsequent overland runoff is the source of transportation of nutrients
to a receiving water body, with larger amounts of phosphorus moving in more intense
rainfall events. We highlight the importance of this transportation mechanism by
comparing policies under climate change scenarios, where the intensity of rainfall is
projected to increase and the time series process of rainfall to change. The climate
change scenarios show a shift towards a heightened risk of conditions supporting
blooms and an increasing importance of spatial prioritization of nutrient control effort.

In Manuscript 2, we introduce a new economic groundwater model that incorporates
the gradual shift from irrigation to dryland farming as parts of an aquifer run dry. We

accomplish this using an upside down cone to represent the spatial depletion, where
the area of irrigable land above the aquifer shrinks as the water level decreases.
Depletion of the aquifer may interact with uncertainty of the supply of water because
the buffer that groundwater provides is no longer available. In this work, we identify
the impact of spatial depletion on welfare gains from optimal management when
rainfall is stochastic and follows a Markov process. Using a stylized model and
dynamic programming, we estimate gains from moving away from current myopic
extraction behavior to optimal use of the resource.

When applied to Kansas over a section of the Ogallala Aquifer, we find gains from
management ranging from 2.88% to 3.01% with larger gains achieved under
uncertainty in the rainfall process. We find that including the dynamic of the gradual
spatial depletion of the aquifer does materially impact welfare results compared to
other estimates of the same region. Surprisingly the serial correlation of rainfall
matters little. Empirically, multi-year droughts combined with the loss of access to the
aquifer only slightly increases welfare gains due to the availability of dryland farming
and the productivity of that option as a backstop when available.

Manuscript 3 empirically estimates the effect of an increase in natural gas pipeline
capacity in New England on monthly equilibrium natural gas prices and quantities for
the electric sector. Weather plays an important role in defining the demand for natural
gas due to its use for heating and electricity generation in the winter and through

electricity demand for cooling in the summer. The cost of natural gas has important
consequences to the wellbeing and cost of living for millions of customers either
relying directly on natural gas for heating, or electric energy consumers indirectly.
This paper presents results of reduced form price and quantity time series regressions
using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) followed by results of a dynamic simultaneous
equation model (SEM) of the market system. Using derived empirical relationships,
prices and quantities for natural gas are estimated under various weather scenarios as
well as under current and expanded capacity. I highlight the role capacity has in
effecting the variability of the price of energy to the region.

This work adds to the literature by providing empirical evidence and the quantification
of the effect of constrained pipeline supply in an important energy market, where
weather conditions, multiple demand sectors and alternative fuels determine the cost
of energy. I find that capacity is a significant factor in the prices and quantities of
natural gas consumed by the electric sector, with an increase in pipeline capacity of
1% leading to an average decrease in price of .48% and an increase in consumption of
.2%. The SEM model finds both supply and demand to be price inelastic.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is written in the three-manuscript form. The first manuscript is coauthored with Jim Opaluch. The second manuscript is co-authored with Todd Guilfoos
and is under review at the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Manuscript 1: Controlling Nutrient Pollution and the Risk of Cyanobacteria Blooms
Manuscript 2: Optimal Groundwater Management Under Uncertainty and Spatial
Depletion
Manuscript 3: Weather, Energy and Capacity: Dynamics of the Natural Gas Market in
New England
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Abstract
This paper assesses policies for controlling the risk of cyanobacteria (blue-green algae) blooms
stimulated by excess nutrients. We examine cost-effective strategies that are based on addressing the
probability mass in the upper tail of the distribution of phosphorus loads and resultant concentrations,
which are disproportionately influential in supporting episodic blooms. Combining a hydrologic and
economic model for a drinking water reservoir watershed in Rhode Island, we solve for the efficient
allocation of best management practices (BMPs) on livestock pastures to meet a monthly risk-based
objective as well as a mean-based water quality objective. We hypothesize that management designed
to control the upper tail of the probability distribution of phosphorus concentrations implies different
efficient management actions as compared to controlling mean conditions. We find a shift to more
intense effort on fewer acres when a risk-based objective is specified with cost savings of meeting risk
levels of up to 25% over mean-based policies. Additionally, we illustrate the relative cost effectiveness
of various policies designed to meet this risk-based objective.
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Introduction
Water quality impairments often present in discrete events, for example: fish kills,
algal blooms, red tides, and beach closures. For the cases involving excess nutrient
loading, these perceivable damaging occurrences are the more noticeable result of
complex interactions across the landscape between humans, climate and ecological
systems. Rainfall and subsequent runoff is the transportation mechanism for nutrients
from the landscape to water bodies. Since rainfall is variable, any sought after water
quality benefits of policy interventions are stochastic. Changes in policy create spatial
and temporal configurations of human activity that in turn affect the distribution of
conditions in a water body (Milon 1987).
This paper assesses policies for controlling the risk of cyanobacteria (blue-green
algae) blooms stimulated by excess nutrients. We examine cost-effective strategies
that are based on addressing the probability mass in the upper tail of the distribution of
phosphorus concentrations in a water body, which are disproportionately influential in
supporting episodic blooms. Combining a hydrologic and economic model for a
drinking water reservoir watershed in Rhode Island, we solve for the efficient
allocation of best management practices (BMPs) on livestock pastures to meet a
monthly risk-based as well as a mean-based water quality objective. We hypothesize
that management based on controlling the upper tail of the probability distribution of
phosphorus (P) concentrations in the reservoir implies different efficient management
actions as compared to controlling mean conditions. We find a shift to more intense
effort on fewer acres when a risk-based objective is specified with cost savings of
meeting risk levels of up to 25% over mean-based policies. Additionally, we illustrate
3

the relative cost effectiveness of various policies designed to meet this risk-based
objective.
Rainfall and the subsequent overland runoff is a source of transportation of nutrients to
a water body, with larger amounts of P moving in more intense rainfall events. We
highlight the importance of this transportation mechanism by comparing policies
under climate change scenarios, where the intensity of rainfall is projected to increase
and the time series process of rainfall is projected to change for Rhode Island. The
climate change scenarios show a shift towards a heightened risk of conditions
supporting blooms and an increasing importance of spatial prioritization of nutrient
control effort.
Background
Cyanobacteria blooms are challenging to address because they are episodic. They are
patchy and difficult to predict (Hudnell 2008) because they depend upon the
confluence of factors including sunlight, nutrients (especially phosphorus), pH,
precipitation, water temperature, water flow, and water column stability (EPA 2012).
Under favorable conditions, cyanobacteria populations can rapidly proliferate and
create extensive blooms dominated by a single (or a few) species that release toxins
harmful to ecosystems and humans. Even in the absence of toxic effects,
cyanobacteria blooms can result in adverse effects on taste and odor of drinking water
(EPA 2012).
Of the conditions supporting blooms in fresh water, P loads and resultant in-lake
concentrations are the most dependent upon anthropogenic sources and most amenable
4

to management. P loads are stochastic since transport to receiving waters is mediated
primarily by eroded soil moving in surface runoff (James & Alexander 1998; AL
Heathwaite 2000; Morgan 2001). As a consequence, extreme precipitation events are
influential in determining transport of P to water bodies, and contributing to conditions
favorable to blooms. Policy within this stochastic context must be effective in
controlling P loading in larger precipitation events that lie in the tails of the probability
distribution. This could be of increasing concern in coming decades, as there are
projections that climate change will increase high intensity precipitation events (IPCC
2007; Meehl et al. 2005; IPCC 2011; Kunkel et al. 2013).
The location and mix of nutrient control effort across a watershed affects both the
average emissions as well as the shape of the distribution of emissions throughout
varying weather conditions. When damages from P emissions are attributed to
threshold based events, those damages are not a linear function of P concentrations, or
continuous estimates of damages are unknown (Lathrop et al. 1998), then optimal
nutrient control efforts that address mean conditions may differ greatly from those that
address damaging occurrences or threshold violations (Shortle & Horan 2001).
Therefore, simple rules for improving abatement efficiency by focusing on the lowest
marginal cost abaters in terms of average emissions do not necessarily hold (Shortle
1990). Rather, policy must consider the upper tail of the distribution of emissions and
correlations across emitters.
Policy prescriptions to address a non-point source nutrient control problem in both a
static as well as dynamic setting focus on location (and possibly time) differentiated
taxes, subsidies, or standards based on estimated marginal damage of runoff, ambient
5

conditions or input factors to approach optimal configurations of production and
abatement effort (Goetz & Zilberman 2000; Segerson 1988; Shortle & Horan 2013).
Many studies use mean Nitrogen and Phosphorus concentrations or reduction targets
as constraints to solve for the optimal allocation of nutrient control effort (Rabotyagov
et al. 2010; Gitau et al. 2004; Arabi et al. 2008; Kling 2011). A number have explored
costs in addressing probabilistic objectives of nutrient concentrations (Kampas &
White 2004; Elofsson 2003; Shortle & Horan 2001; Gren et al. 2002; Milon 1987;
Kataria et al. 2010; Zhu et al. 1994; Huang et al. 2012) and find distributional
assumptions of emissions and the strictness of the probabilistic objective effect the
efficiency of nutrient control design.
This work contributes to the literature by assessing the efficiency of the design of
water quality improving policy to meet a risk-based objective. In contrast to previous
work, we quantify the efficiency of policy designed to address a probabilistic
constraint representing the risk-based objective as compared to mean-based policy
using a hydrologic and numerical optimization model, while maintaining the important
discrete nature of the problem. The resultant differences between efficient and second
best allocations to address a risk-based objective show not just the total cost savings,
but also the practical implications for how the allocation would differ across the
watershed. By integrating climate model projections, we show that climate change
may shift the risk profile and increase the importance of addressing the risk-based goal
directly. The results underscore the need of spatially prioritizing nutrient control
activities.
Conceptual Model
6

We assume a watershed partly consisting of heterogeneous agricultural fields with
varying physical properties (e.g., slope, soil type, location). P accumulates in the soil
over time and is transported off fields into waterways with precipitation events. P
flows with water downstream to a water body, henceforth, reservoir, which provides
ecosystem services valued by society.
We formulate the problem as finding the least-cost allocations of nutrient control
effort to meet probabilistic constraints. This is in contrast to finding an economically
optimal solution, which would include a damage function explicitly into the objective
function. A damage function might take many forms depending on the water quality
impairment. For instance, if damages were linear in concentrations, addressing mean
concentrations would be sufficient. However, if the damages were convex to
concentrations, or based on a threshold where damages are minimal and increase after
a particular point, then higher order moments in the distribution of conditions matter
to policy design. A probabilistic constraint can handle this type of least-cost problem
by addressing the shape of the distribution of conditions (Shortle 1990). Our
application to cyanobacteria blooms, which are known to be particularly reliant on
high levels of P concentrations, fits this type problem. The damages are uncertain, but
damaging blooms are, at the least, nonlinearly related to nutrient concentrations.

The distribution of total P loading at a water body is the sum of individual sources of
emission less loss in transport. Stricter correlation between the sources leads to more
burdensome probabilistic constraints and higher costs (Kampas & White 2004;
Elofsson 2003). Given that each farm’s emissions are highly correlated when rainfall
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is assumed consistent across the space, highly correlated loadings seem like a
reasonable assumption, especially in a geographically small watershed. Each
heterogeneous source will contribute a different but correlated distribution of nutrient
loading based on its soil type, slope, inputs and location, or more generally a source’s
place on the P transfer continuum (Haygarth et al. 2005). We assume the watershed of
concern is sufficiently small that rainfall is perfectly correlated across fields.
Assumptions of the distribution of pollutant load and transport can have large
implications for estimates of efficient abatement (Gren et al. 2002; Kataria et al.
2010). In the numerical application below, we rely on a physical process-based
hydrologic model to estimate the important relationships.
The goal of policy is to control the risk of cyanobacteria blooms by taking actions
across the watershed to maintain P concentrations in a water body, a reservoir in our
application, below a target concentration to avoid conditions that are favorable for
blooms. However, P concentrations are stochastic, since loads depend upon random
precipitation, especially upon extreme precipitation events. As a consequence, we
specify policies that control the probability that a threshold is violated. Hence, the
optimization problem is formulated as finding the least-costly set of control policies
such that the probability of exceeding a threshold for P concentrations in the reservoir
is less than a target level, .
Soil P concentration on a field at time ,

, is a state variable that evolves over time

following the dynamic equation
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where F represents fertilizer inputs, A represents density of animal units,

and

represent the associated P application rates per unit,

represents the loss rate for

phosphorus (e.g., loss through plant uptake).

represents the field-specific

rate of P emissions associated with a precipitation rate, rt, and soil P
concentrations,

, at time t. Therefore,

represents the rate of P loss

associated with soil erosion and runoff from rainfall. It is commonly assumed that the
relationship between soil erosion, a major source of P loading, and rainfall intensity
follows a power law. This assumption is based on the characteristics of sediment
movement as a result of rainfall kinetic energy (van Dijk et al. 2002), and motivates
the non-linear relationship between rainfall intensity and P loading. However, erosion
and nutrient loss are a function of a number of other factors including soil saturation,
slope and vegetative cover. In the numerical application below, we rely on a physical
process-based hydrologic model to estimate the important relationships.
P control practices (BMPs) are represented as affecting runoff and are represented by
the function

. The simplest, and widely used formulation for P control is to use

BMP efficiencies, which are a fixed percentage reduction of nutrient runoff based on
edge of field studies. This is the assumption made in the empirical model presented
below, but we will leave the theoretical model more general. Therefore, the P
emissions,

where

, in total loading (kg) terms from one field in time t are:

is the size of field i. Since the objective of the study is the water quality at the

reservoir, the total loading is the sum of the loading from the n heterogeneous fields,
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as well as the additional loading from all other land use types that are not in the choice
set of nutrient control. Because water remains in the reservoir for a period of time
(residence time), the reservoir is itself a sink of nutrients and has its own in-lake
processes. The P concentration,

, in the reservoir at any one point in time is a stock

variable progressing by an equation of motion.

is a function of both aggregate loading as well as the associated water
volume,

in order to convert the P loads (in kg) to concentrations (ppb).

represents the emission from all other land not considered for nutrient control actions.
The function

represents the in-lake processes that might affect the progress of P

concentrations.
Therefore, the stochastic optimization problem can be described as follows:

Where:
- Combination of BMPs on field i in time t

10

- Set of BMP options
- Cost of BMP employed on field i at time t
- Size of field i
- P soil concentration on field i in time t
- Field specific rainfall to emissions function
- Fertilizer applied on field i in time t
- Animal density on field i in time t
- P uptake and stabilization on field
- P concentration in reservoir
- P concentration threshold
- P runoff of field i in time t
- In-lake functions
- P loading from land uses not in the choice space
- Probability of exceeding threshold (risk level)
- Rainfall
represents the set of chosen controls given the available options (BMP), with costs
in a given period

. The choice of controls effects P runoff,

, from each

heterogeneous pasture land i with environmental factors (e.g., field size, location,
slope, soil type) whose runoff to rainfall relationship is defined by

. Each

distribution varies by environmental factors and its shape is determined by choices of
P control on each farm. The P threshold,

, is the concentration of P that

supports damaging cyanobacteria blooms. The term

, represents

the probabilistic constraint on the reservoir concentrations being above this threshold
only % of the time or less.

captures the risk-based water quality objective.

Replacing the probabilistic constraint above with the following represents the meanbased water quality objective:
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where

captures strictness of the mean-based water quality objective.

Empirical Application
The framework above is applied to the problem of controlling conditions supporting
cynanobacteria blooms in the Scituate Reservoir watershed in Rhode Island. The
Scituate Reservoir Watershed is 86 square miles and is made up of five subwatersheds, which drain into the Scituate Reservoir system, which is owned and
managed by the Providence Water Supply Board, Figure 1. The watershed is rural and
mostly forested (79%) with light and medium residential (7%) and (6%) agriculture,
including pasture, row crop and orchard land. Providence Water owns and manages
25% of the total watershed area as conservation land. The reservoir system provides
water services to 60% of residents and business of Rhode Island including the
municipalities of Providence, N. Providence, Warwick, E. Providence, Western
Cranston, Kent Co., East Smithfield, Smithfield, Greenville and Lincoln accounting
for 92 million gallons a day. Taken as a whole system, the water quality is good. As
described by loadings of nitrogen, it is considered low risk. Phosphorus loading to
surface water (.18 kg/ac/year) is only slightly elevated above natural background
values (.09 kg/ac/year) (Scituate Reservoir Source Water Assessment 2003).

The Scituate Reservoir system is made up of five sub-reservoirs (Figure 1). More
recently, a limnological study was conducted for the Regulating1 and Moswansicut
sub-reservoirs and found total P levels indicating a body of water in a mesotrophic to
1

“Regulating” is a proper name for the sub-reservoir of the Scituate Reservoir system.
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eutrophic state. Given the variable nature of rainfall, P concentration values ranged
from below detection levels to 36 ppb, indicating a lake in a eutrophic state (ESS
Group, Inc. 2011). Pollution abatement efforts is well described by the theoretical
model presented earlier, since the Regulating reservoir is observed crossing a
threshold of conditions for which algae blooms are present and since damages are
related to discrete bloom events. A water manager may only care about average
condition of the lake insomuch as it controls the probability of exceeding the eutrophic
threshold and exposure to a risk of an algae bloom. More efficient use of resources
may be to target areas that have loadings, which are particularly sensitive (convex) to
larger rainfall events, based on environmental factors, therefore limiting the total
loading during the more extreme events. The possible resource savings and practical
implications are quantified in the results.

The RI Department of Environmental Management’s maximum total P standard for
freshwater lakes and reservoirs is 25 ppb (Rhode Island Office of Water Resources
2009), which corresponds to the eutrophic threshold of 50 on the trophic state index
(TSI) (Carlson 1977). Based on the standard Vollenweider model, a lake or reservoir
with characteristics of the Regulating Reservoir with a total volume of 1314 acre feet,
a mean depth of 1.7 meters and an average residence time of 21.4 days, a yearly
loading of roughly 790 kg of P would correspond to an annual average P concentration
of 25 ppb (Vollenweider 1971).

13

A water body with a concentration exceeding 50 ppb, or 60 on the TSI scale, is at a
level where algae blooms occur and where cyanobacteria may dominate. This would
correspond to a yearly loading of roughly 1000 kg of P. However, this yearly
concentration is made up of a series of monthly loadings and water flows. Therefore to
construct the monthly risk measure for this paper and with the relatively short
residence time of the reservoir, we use a monthly (May-October) inflow concentration
above this 50 ppb threshold as the proxy for conditions that could support
cyanobacteria blooms. This inflow concentration is calculated by using the variable
monthly flow into the reservoir and the monthly total P loadings. The probability that
the threshold is violated is the risk-level,

in the conceptual model. This threshold

and the cumulative distribution function of monthly concentrations modeled for the
Regulating Reservoir can be found in Figure 2.

We use a flow-calibrated model, the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), to
estimate phosphorus loading to the reservoir as a function of rainfall and land use
(Gassman et al. 2007). SWAT is a process-based water-modeling tool designed to
simulate the surface and ground water quality and quantity, and to predict effects of
land use change, land management practices, and climate change in complex
watersheds. SWAT is a public domain model available free for download
(http://swat.tamu.edu/). The SWAT model was developed and refined by the USDA
Agricultural Research Service and Texas A&M University over a period of more than
30 years and has supported hundreds of scientific papers.
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As part of a larger ecosystem service study in the watershed, our work focuses on
practices installed on small acreage livestock farms to address nutrient loading and
water quality in the watershed. Including variability in the animal density would be
preferable as this information also describes the rainfall to P runoff relationships.
However due to privacy concerns, we were not able to obtain site-specific animal
counts. As a consequence, we use the average animal density in the watershed (.5
AU/acre), as described by a livestock tally for the towns overlapping the watershed
conducted by the Northern Rhode Island Conservation District (NRICD). This density
was applied to all pastureland in the model. Given these assumptions, loadings from
pasture land (about 3% of the watershed area) represent about 7% of the total P
loadings to the Regulating reservoir.
In practice, nutrient control policies can only target a subset of loading to a given
water body. There are natural loadings as well as other anthropogenic sources that
may not be considered for management options. Therefore, policy in any watershed
affects a subset of the total loadings and may have a limited effect on water quality.
However, certain loading sources may be more sensitive to rainfall intensity and
runoff and nutrient control effort on this land may affect the distribution of conditions
in a water body. Pasture land in particular is a large source of sediment bound P
loading and a natural place to direct effort (Harmel et al. 2006). While representing a
fraction of the average loadings, management actions taken may affect the water
quality in the reservoir if damages are convex or based on threshold concentration. In
our case, management actions could affect the probability that the eutrophic threshold
is violated.
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We use historic daily rainfall data collected by the Kingston Weather Station in
Kingston, RI as well as output from downscaled climate models with the calibrated
hydrologic model to estimate P loads and concentrations in the reservoir. SWAT is
used to construct a response surface for exploring the P loading by month under
different combinations of BMPs applied to pasture land. SWAT is only run once per
climate rainfall scenario to generate location, soil, and land use specific loadings and
water flow.
BMPs were simulated using efficiencies from the literature following common
practice, as presented in Table 1. These efficiencies are estimated by edge of field
studies and represent the percent of baseline loadings that are reduced by the
installation of a certain practice. The effects of BMPs are assumed multiplicative when
combined (Rao et al. 2009; Gitau et al. 2004). The costs of installing and operating
each BMP over 20 years is based on the accounting for practices in RI in the NRCS
EQUIP Payment Practice Schedules for 2012 assuming a 5% discount rate (USDA
Natural Resource Conservation Service 2012). BMPs are treated as discrete practices.
With three practices, this results in a total of 8 combinations on each farm. Each
practice was characterized by a fixed and variable (per acreage) cost. The manure
management BMP was translated from volume based variable cost to acreage based
on average animal density in the watershed. These costs are shown in Table 1. For the
simulation, we assume that it is a one-time decision to install and maintain the BMPs
over their lifetimes.
Optimization
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The objective of the numerical optimization is to solve for the least-cost allocation of
BMPs across the pasture land at each risk level within the feasible set of solutions for
each climate rainfall scenario. Given the set of farms and choices there are eight
combinations of practices on 113 parcels resulting in a problem with 8113 unique
combinations of practices across the watershed. These discrete choices affect the
distribution of runoff from each parcel of pasture land, which, when combined with
loading from all other land types, sum to the total loading and distribution of P
concentrations at the reservoir. An optimization of this type is a chance-constrained
integer-programming problem. The problem is large, stochastic, and non-smooth. We
use Matlab 2013 and the Global Optimization Toolbox’s Genetic Algorithm (GA)
integer optimization routine combined with output from SWAT and the cost and BMP
effectiveness estimates described above to estimate the least-cost frontier.

GAs belong to a family of evolutionary algorithms, where possible solutions
(individuals) to the objective function progress through populations and generations
based on their relative fitness scores representing the optimization goal. Each new
generation is created by crossing over (randomly combining) elements of better-fit
individuals to create offspring. Through repetition, mutation and natural selection, the
population converges to a solution. GAs have been used in nutrient abatement
optimization frameworks by many authors (Gitau et al. 2004; Rabotyagov et al. 2010;
Jha et al. 2009; Srivastava et al. 2002; Arabi et al. 2008). In our case, the solution is
the allocation of BMPs across the landscape and its corresponding costs and risk level.
One of the inequality constraints is the risk level on concentrations of inflow to the
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reservoir. A GA is well suited for this type of spatial problem, as it does not require
linearity, continuity, or differentiability in the objective or constraint functions (Arabi
et al. 2008)

The makeup of the initial population affects the efficiency of the routine as well as the
width of the solution space that it searches, which is important in confirming a found
solution is a global and not local optima. Taking advantage of some prior knowledge,
the initial population for the GA was seeded with individuals representing uniform
adoption of each practice or across the board adoption of all possible BMP
combinations, as well as allocations found by incentive based policies described
below. The remaining individuals were generated randomly using a uniform
distribution. In order to cover a wide range of solutions, the algorithm was run with a
population of 500 individuals, for a maximum of 500 generations, or until the
variability of the fitness values of individuals within the population was within a
function tolerance.

We solved for the least-cost allocation of BMPs for each level of risk within the lower
and upper bounds of our choice set, which are the risk levels between no installations
and all practices installed on every farm. We proceed by seeding the initial
populations for the GA with previously found optimal solutions. We execute this
process under the probabilistic constrain as well as under the mean constraint for each
rainfall scenario. As a robustness check and to confirm the GA was behaving
correctly, we compared the allocations found by the GA under the mean concentration
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constraint (without the allocations resulting from policy scenarios in the initial
population) to the simple method of sorting the farms by the average per unit cost of
abatement, which defines the efficient progression for the mean concentration goal.
The two solutions were identical.

Policy Scenarios
We construct cost functions for each of the following policy designs, where the
function for each design indicates the cost of achieving each risk level. We compare
the efficient allocation found using the optimization process above to three simulated
policies: a location differentiated subsidy; a flat subsidy based on the relative
effectiveness of the BMPs, but devoid of location specific factors; and a uniform
standards approach. The subsidies are simulated assuming each farmer chooses the
practice(s) on his/her farm to maximize the value of a one-time up front subsidy minus
the discounted present cost of installing and operating the practices. We assess
efficiency in terms of the cost of the installed practices to meet risk levels. The
subsidy is treated as a transfer payment rather than a social cost.
The location-specific subsidy assumes a one time up-front payment is offered for
installing practices, with the total payment based on the average annual amount of P
abated at the reservoir due to the practice or combination of practices on a farm. The
payment is fixed across the watershed for a kg of P abated, but the abatement effects
of BMPs vary for a particular practice on a farm. For example, if farmer x installs a
practice which would result in a average reduction of 1 kg P/year from reaching the
reservoir and the watershed wide per kg P incentive is $1000, the farmer weighs the
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total one time payment of $1000 against the cost of installing and operating that
practice over 20 years.2 The farmer chooses the combination of practices that
maximizes net profit, including the option of no BMP installations. Clearly, this type
of subsidy requires an agency to model and offer site-specific subsidy schedules based
on a particular farm’s heterogeneous effect, which is a tall task, both in terms of
transparency, politics and operational constraints. The benefits, quantified in our
results, would be a more cost-effective allocation of effort due to using the sitespecific factors.
This setup is similar to the USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), where land
is retired and put into environmentally friendly management practices in return for a
rental rate from the government. The program relies on bids from the farmers that are
then ranked by an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI). The EBI balances many
environmental goals such as soil conservation, nutrient retention and wildlife habitat.
The EBI is spatially differentiated by distance to water bodies, soil type and slope, as
well as giving weight to certain land based on particular initiatives. The government
picks the top ranked bids based on cost-effectiveness and budgetary constraints. If
accepted, the yearly payments are set at the bid price the farmer submitted for the life
of the contract (USDA 2015). The difference compared to the first location-specific
subsidy policy is that we assume a payment is offered based on the farm’s effect and
the farmers choose if that is in their best interest. The equivalent in the CRP
framework would be if the government offered a fixed payment based on a unit of EBI
and informed a farmer of their possible payment for installing a practice on their
2

An alternative way to think about this on time upfront payment would be to consider an equivalent
yearly payments whose present value is equal to this $1000.
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particular farm based on that farm’s total EBI. Thus, there is a difference in market
mechanism, with the CRP program based on accepting asking prices from farmers,
and the subsidy described in this paper based on farmers accepting bid prices from the
government. These differences could have implications to participation, size of
transfer payments, but not necessarily allocate efficiency in terms of social cost.
The second policy scenario, a flat subsidy, assumes a subsidy based only on
information of farm size and practice, but no other site-specific information.
Therefore, it is a subsidy based on an assumed per acre relative effectiveness of the
BMPs and the farm size. Hence, if the payment for a practice were $100 per acre, a
practice that is twice as effective in general would receive $200 per acre regardless of
the particular farm’s P loading. The installation decisions follow the same logic as
above, with the farmers choosing the practices that maximize their net profit.
These subsidy based policy designs are simulated for the full range of achievable
allocations by varying the payments to cover the whole range of effects. This would be
the per kg P payments that would induce the range from the minimum to where
maximum BMPs are installed based on the implementation choices by farmers. The
allocations are evaluated based on achieving risk levels at various costs in the results
section.
The final sets of policies are uniform standards. Under the uniform standard policy,
each farm is required to adopt a particular combination of the three BMPs. A cost
function for uniform standards is constructed by calculating the costs and associated
risk levels for each of the eight possible BMP combinations.
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Climate Scenarios
As indicated above, extremes in precipitation intensity are central for determining P
loads. This could have important implications for P concentrations and associated risk
of cyanobacteria blooms because, while significant uncertainty is involved, there is an
expectation that the Northeastern US will experience an increase in total annual
rainfall and an increased percent that falls in extreme precipitation events (Karl et al.
2009; IPCC 2011). We use the process described below to model rainfall parameters
in order to assess management actions under baseline and future climate change
scenarios, where the probability distribution and time series nature of rainfall changes.
Baseline downscaled climate model runs did not sufficiently reproduce the same
statistical properties of the observed time series.3 Consequently we retained the
statistical parameters of the observed series and apply the implied differences in those
parameters from the climate model runs to create the future scenarios in order to make
a proper comparison. The changes between the present and future runs for each of the
statistical parameters for each month were calculated in percent terms. These deltas
between the modeled past and future from the climate model runs were averaged by
RCP scenario and applied to the historic observed parameters (1961-2010) to generate
the future climate scenarios for input to the hydrologic model (Wilks 2012).

3

For practitioners, Auffhammer et al. (2013) provides a clear overview the pitfalls of using climate
model output in economic analyses. When comparing the past and future projections, the same spatial
scale should be used. Since the SWAT model was calibrated using the observed time series from one
gauge station, and the climate model data was at 1/8°, which reproduces the properties of the average
conditions in the time step (daily) of an area about 54 square miles, the modeled distribution of daily
rainfall differs with the past observations.
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We model precipitation with a two-stage process. First, we determine whether a day is
wet or dry. Then, we determine precipitation amounts for wet days. The probability of
a wet day (more than trace amounts of precipitation) is modeled using a first-order
Markov process (Srikanthan & McMahon 1999). Hence, the first stage is to model the
probabilities of rainfall on date t for the cases where date t-1 was wet and where date t1 is dry. To do so, we specify the conditional probability of date t being wet when date
t-1 was wet (P(wt|wt-1)) and conditional probability of date t being wet when date t-1
was dry (P(wt|dt-1)). We model rainfall amounts for wet days using a two-parameter
gamma distribution following the methods described in Davison et al, (2005) and
Geng et al. (1986). We estimate the parameters of the gamma distribution of rainfall
applying method of moments matching to historic daily rainfall data and the climate
model runs.
We use historic daily rainfall data for Rhode Island from 1961 to 2010 from the
Kingston, RI weather station to calculate these two conditional probabilities and
gamma parameters for each month for the baseline rainfall scenario. We then create a
100-year time series of simulated daily rainfall with the observed statistical properties
for input to the hydrologic model. We use a longer series for the simulation than the
50-year windows used to calculate rainfall parameters in order to better populate the
discrete distribution of monthly concentrations under each scenario. To create the
future rainfall scenarios, we calculated the parameters described above for both
historic (1950-1999) and future (2050-2099) runs of 55 statistically downscaled
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climate model runs from the CMIP5 multi-model ensemble4 made available at the
Downscaled CMIP3 and CMIP5 Climate and Hydrology Projections archive
(Reclamation 2013). Model runs were from both the RCP 6.0 (representative
concentration pathways) and RCP 8.5 emission scenarios (Reclamation 2013).
Different teams of researchers developed each pathway with alternate assumptions on
technology and economic growth. Descriptions of these can be found at the RCP
Database (2014). The RCP 6.0 scenario is a middle of the road scenario assuming
technological advances and a leveling off of radiative forcing by 2100. The RCP 8.5
emission scenario is based on high levels of greenhouse gas concentrations and
radiative forcing.5
These results are summarized in Table 2. The average of the changes in the models
imply that the intensity of daily rainfall will increase, which can be seen in the percent
increase in the scale parameters from the climate change models. This shifts the rainy
day distribution to increase the frequency of larger rainfall amounts. The decreases in
the shape parameter implies rainfall on a wet day will be less normally distributed and
become closer to an exponentially distributed random variable, in other words: less
symmetric and more skewed with more probability mass in the upper tails. These
parameter changes mean an increase in the intensity of daily rainfall events. The
change in the Markov chain parameters are mixed, but a decrease in the probability of

4

We acknowledge the World Climate Research Programme's Working Group on Coupled Modeling,
which is responsible for CMIP, and we thank the climate modeling groups for producing and making
available their model output. For CMIP the US Department of Energy's Program for Climate Model
Diagnosis and Intercomparison provides coordinating support and led development of software
infrastructure in partnership with the Global Organization for Earth System Science Portals.
5
Radiative forcing is the amount of energy that is retained by the atmosphere as a result of greenhouse
gases. A great explanation is found in Chandler (2010)
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a wet day followed by a wet day, P (wt|wt-1), means that when rainfall occurs it will
occur in shorter more intense events over a shorter run of consecutive days than under
current rainfall conditions. The probability of a wet day following a dry day, P (wt|dt1),

increases, which means dry spells will be shorter with the exception of August

where the probability slightly decreases. In summary, these climate models point to a
climate that is wetter in total and with more intense rainfall events than under the
current conditions. These more intense events should cause more overland flow,
sediment erosion, leading to nutrient loading at the reservoir. We rely on the SWAT
model to simulate the time series nature of soil saturation, runoff at rainfall events, as
well as nutrients transported and associated water flow to the reservoir.
Results
The simulation and optimization provide the least-cost allocation of BMPs and those
induced by the policy options in the watershed as well as the resultant distribution of
monthly total P concentrations at the reservoir. We compare the allocations in terms of
cost, density of practices and size of participating farms. The following results are
broken down into those under the observed rainfall scenario followed by those under
the climate change rainfall scenarios.
Baseline Rainfall Scenario
The range of outcomes as a result of BMPs installed on pasture land in the watershed
is in Figure 2. The minimum BMP adoption line (thin black line) shows the reservoir’s
P concentration exceeding the 50 ppb 18% of the summer months (May-October),
while at full BMP adoption (thick black line) exceeding this threshold 12% of summer
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months. The distance between the two lines in Figure 2 at the 50 ppb threshold
represents the whole range of feasible outcomes as a result of pasture land BMP
implementation in this watershed.
Figure 3 has this range as the x-axis and plots the cost of achieving these risk levels
under the various policy assumptions. The black line represents the results of the
optimization routine for the risk-based objective, showing the least-cost allocation to
meet the various risk levels, which is the efficient frontier. The light dashed line is the
outcome of the installation costs for the location-specific subsidy based on an
individual farm’s average annual loading. This perfectly corresponds with the efficient
allocation when the objective is to control mean P concentrations. The resultant risk
levels from those allocations are calculated and plotted together. The distance between
the solid and light dashed line is the possible cost savings in defining a risk-based
objective as opposed to controlling the risk of cyanobacteria blooms using mean-based
policy.
The solid grey line is the cost at various risk levels for the flat-payment scenario where
the payments offered is based on the relative effectiveness of each BMP, but with no
regard to the heterogeneous nature of the various pasture land’s emissions. Again, the
distance between each line and the efficient frontier represents the additional cost to
meeting various risk levels above the cost of efficient allocations. The black points are
the cost of the uniform standards, which requires all farmers to adopt the same BMPs,
for each of the eight possible combinations of practices.
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The relative cost efficiency of the various policies differs across risk levels, which can
be seen by the distance between the various alternative policies and the efficient
frontier changing over the range. The allocations resulting from location-specific
subsidy, taking advantage of locations’ differentiated effects, are the closest to the
efficient frontier inducing allocations similar to the least-cost allocations. The
remaining difference represents the efficiency of addressing the risk-based objective
explicitly.
Take an example of achieving a risk level of 13%. The cost of moving from the
current state of 18% to 13% could be achieved optimally at $300,000, but at $335,000
if allocations were designed to meet mean concentration goals instead. This is a
savings of roughly 12% by adopting allocations based on the risk-based objective. The
potential cost savings of explicitly adopting a risk-based allocation ranges from 0 to
25%, with an average of 6.5%.
We have established that the efficient allocation of BMPs across the watershed differs
in cost for the risk-based goal versus a mean-based goal. Interestingly, BMP adoption
strategies for the two approaches differ. The efficient set of BMPs under the riskbased approach is more targeted, with more intensive controls placed on fewer acres.
By comparing the differences in allocations, we can show which farms and practices
change at each risk level. Figure 4 shows the differences in total acres in each practice.
Noticeably, the optimal allocations have fewer acres in practices in total. In terms of
total acres of installed practices, the risk-based objective results in more targeted
effort, with fewer acres enrolled. This varies, but the number of acres averages 3% less
while increasing to 15% less in the higher effort and lower risk levels. The biggest
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differences are in the nutrient management practice, a relatively cheap and less
effective practice, with fewer enrolled acres under efficient allocations to meet a riskbased goal.
An additional way to see the differences is using a heat map approach (Wilkinson &
Friendly 2009), where we characterize the discrete differences based on farm size
between the second best and least-cost allocations. Figure 5 shows the discrete
changes between the two allocations, sorted and shaded by their relative size. Each
rectangle represents a binary decision for a BMP on a farm. The farms are sorted left
to right by size from smallest to largest. The darker color implies a larger farm with a
practice installed in the risk-based allocation but not under the mean-based allocation.
The lighter color implies a larger farm without that BMP in the risk-based allocation,
but existing in the mean-based allocation. The neutral color means the BMPs are the
same in both allocations. There is some variation across the risk levels, but in general
we see the shift to fewer farms in more expensive and impactful practices and a shift
from nutrient management (less impactful, less expensive practice) to manure
management (more impactful, more expensive practice). We also see many smaller
farms shifted out of the risk-based allocations to BMPs on fewer larger farms. The
lower the risk level, the more farms switch their practices, which means the
differences are largest in allocations near the upper limit of what is achievable for risk
reductions.
Given that P loading from pasture lands only made up 7% of the total modeled loading
to the reservoir, the range of reduction in mean P concentrations from installing
practices (23.9 to 27.3 ppb) seems small and the costs hard to justify depending on
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what damages might be associated with changes in mean concentrations. However,
depending on the damage function, the effect of nutrient control efforts may look more
promising in having an overall impact on the water quality by lowering the chances a
water body supports damaging events. For example, over a 20-year timeframe, the
range of effects in terms of risk levels means moving the reservoir from 21.6 summer
months to 14.4 months with P concentrations above the 50 ppb threshold.
While we treated risk based on strict threshold violations, it may be the case that the
shape of the distribution of conditions below the threshold matters for other water
quality goals. It is informative to see the tradeoff of targeting the risk-based objective
in terms of other moments of the distribution of conditions. There exists a tradeoff
between addressing the risk levels efficiently versus the mean concentrations. The
shift towards the addressing the risk levels most cost-effectively comes at the expense
of a slightly higher mean concentration at each risk level when the allocations differ.
This difference is small and between 0, where the allocations match, and .03 ppb at the
maximum difference in spatial allocations of BMPs. So, while there is a difference,
shifting policy to address a risk-based goal is nearly costless in terms of increased
mean concentrations.
We showed that the type of objective, mean or risk-based, matters to the cost-effective
adoption of BMPs across farms and the magnitude of the efficiency of policy designs.
The risk-based objective leads to more intensive control on fewer acres, and a shift
from more spread out effort to fewer, but larger farms with installed BMPs. Our
project was focused on BMPs, where the cost structure had fixed and per acre variable
cost components. As a result, the size of the farm to which the policy is aimed matters
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to the overall cost, with larger farms having generally a smaller per unit cost of P
reduction all else equal. This would also be the case where significant economies of
scales occur for pollution control measures. Economy of scales applies to the cost of
controlling not simply the mean but also higher order moments of a farm’s runoff
distribution. This lead to a trend of targeted and concentrated effort on fewer but larger
farms. Therefore, policy that is spread out more evenly, standards, for example, fared
worse.
Climate Scenario Results
Figure 6 shows the cumulative density function of monthly P concentrations in the
reservoir for both the baseline and the RCP 6.0 rainfall scenarios. The black lines
represent the effects of the maximum (thick black line) and minimum (thin black line)
allocation of BMPs under the RCP 6.0 climate change scenario. The thin lines are the
effects of the maximum (thick grey line) and minimum (thin grey line) allocation but
under the baseline climate scenario. At the 50 ppb threshold, the minimum BMP
allocation risk level is 24% and decreases to just over 19% of months exceeding the
threshold. This compares to a range of 18-12% under the baseline rainfall scenario.
Under future rainfall scenarios, the P conditions that support algal blooms will be
heightened and the risk profile shifted. There is no overlap in risk levels achievable
between the baseline and climate scenarios based on the available land for
management actions. Returning to near the status quo risk level of 18%, as under the
baseline climate scenario, would require near maximum effort (BMP installations)
under climate change rainfall scenarios.
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Figure 7 shows the cost of achieving risk levels under the climate change scenario
using the same second best policies as discussed in the baseline rainfall scenario. The
cost ranges are similar between the baseline and climate scenarios, but only higher
level of risk are achievable. Maintaining risk levels close to those of the current
climate would be just above the upper end of the achievable range and near the highest
total cost of $704 thousand.
There exists larger savings from specifying the risk-based objective explicitly over the
mean-based objective in the climate change scenarios. There are larger cost reductions
moving to the efficient frontier, varying through the levels, than found under baseline
rainfall scenarios. The larger total gains are made in the upper limits of what is
achievable in terms of risk reduction, with an average cost savings in percentage terms
of 10% and ranging from 0-46% depending on the risk level. This difference is larger
in mean and range then the difference under the baseline rainfall scenario. The cost
savings over the flat subsidy policy design is large, averaging 40%, under efficient
allocations, growing in total magnitude over the risk levels. The standards became
even less efficient under the climate scenarios.
Comparing optimal allocations between baseline and the RCP 6.0 climate scenario, the
allocations are similar in terms of the progression of practices installed and the relative
amount of each through the risk levels. The climate scenarios do not imply a major
difference in efficient policy or allocations, but imply larger gains to targeting the riskbased objective explicitly, with larger average gains and a larger maximum gain, 46%
versus 25%. As rainfall becomes more intense, the possible benefits from moving
towards efficient policy based on a probabilistic objective become larger and uniform
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standards become progressively less desirable. Given the differences in allocations,
with a shift to fewer but larger farms with BMPs installed when addressing a riskbased objective, the results of the climate change scenario suggests the gains from
doing so are larger. Under future climate conditions, spatial prioritization may become
more beneficial for this threshold based water quality objective.
We presented a middle of the road emissions pathway, RCP 6.0, above. From Table 2
we can see the changes under a more severe scenario of climate change. The same
trends in the cost effectiveness are intensified under the RCP 8.5 scenario. Figure 8
shows the cost at risk levels for the baseline and two climate change scenarios
together. The risk levels for the two climate scenarios overlap, so a direct comparison
at risk levels can be made. For a given risk level, the allocations under the RCP 8.5
scenario are further up the cost curves and result in more BMP implementation.
Equivalent risk levels are achieved at costs $100-500 thousand more than under RCP
6.0 scenario, visually, the distance between the two curves in Figure 8.
Conclusion
The variability of natural systems poses challenges in addressing and quantifying the
costs and benefits of policies. This paper uses a combined hydrologic and economic
model to solve the discrete optimization problem to compare the cost effectiveness of
policies for nutrient loading to the efficient frontier under both a risk-based and a
mean-based water quality objective. Controlling a risk factor for cyanobacteria blooms
in drinking water, which are dependent on conditions violating a eutrophic threshold,
motivated the approach.
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Achieving a risk-based water quality goal, especially applicable to cases where
damages are convex to a pollutant or are based on a threshold, results in a different
management strategy than meeting objectives based on average conditions. Different
sets of pollution control actions and allocations across space can affect higher order
moments of the distribution of conditions as opposed to just the mean. We find that
achieving the risk-based objective leads to a more targeted approach, with more
intensive measures being adopted on fewer but larger sites. Given the results above,
focusing on fewer, but more important larger farms may be more cost effective in
controlling episodic loadings and damages.

This is in contrast to traditional

approaches of uniform technology standards or spatially uniform incentives.
Policy designs vary in the amount of differentiation in terms of how they treat
heterogeneous sources of emissions. For a risk-based objective, the importance of
spatial prioritization becomes larger. In our application, the efficiency of three
alternative incentive policies showed the relative cost effectiveness of various second
best policies to the risk-based efficient allocations. Utilizing location-specific mean
loadings, and a watershed wide uniform payment for P abatement, matched the
optimal allocations to address a mean concentration goal. This was closest to the riskbased efficient frontier out of the alternatives considered but still up to 25% more
costly to meet a given risk level than the efficient allocations.
Rainfall, which is the transportation mechanism for many pollutants affecting water
quality, is projected to change in its intensity and timing with climate change. This
will affect both the mean and higher order moments of the distribution of water born
pollution conditions in the environment. We find this has implications to the efficiency
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of policy. Specifically, the climate change scenarios increase the cost difference
between mean and risk-based policies. Incorporating location specific factors into
policy when the damages are based on a threshold is more important under more
intense future rainfall. For our application, this difference grows with up to 46% lost
between the efficient and second best policies. The non-location differentiated policies
and uniform standards are also progressively worse in terms of efficiency.
Depending on how often and how far away from the threshold a water body of interest
is, marginal changes in effort can have effects on the risk profile of a water body. To
best make use of what might be a limited area of land where nutrient control effort
might take place, prioritizing locations based on addressing the objective that best
represents the damage or goal of the policy could save scarce resources. For the case
of cyanobacteria blooms, we find that policy designed to address the probability of
crossing a monthly eutrophic threshold of phosphorus concentrations differ than that
to address mean concentrations, resulting in more concentrated actions being taken on
a smaller number of sites.
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Figures and Tables

TABLE 1
BMP Characteristics

BMP
Prescribed Grazing
Manure Management
Nutrient Management

P reduction
efficiency Fixed Cost Variable Cost
25%
$3,750
$266
per acre
80%
$1,000
$2,300
per acre
47%
$1,650
$75
per acre

NOTE- BMP efficiencies were adapted from Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model (Chesapeake
Bay Commission 2012; Gitau et al. 2004; Qui 2011). Cost information was adapted from
NRCS Equip costing information (USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service 2012).
These practices are the ones deemed relevant to the RI study area. Manure management
practice was scaled to reflect the watershed animal density and acreage to create the variable
cost.
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TABLE 2
Climate Change Rainfall Parameters
Historic Rainfall Parameters
Gamma Parameters
Scale
Shape
Month
(mm)
(mm)

Climate Adjustment (RCP 6.0)

Markov Probabilities
P(Wt|Wt-1) P(Wt|Dt-1)

Climate Adjustment (RCP 8.5)

Gamma Parameters Markov Probabilities
Scale

Shape P(Wt|Wt-1) P(Wt|Dt-1)

Gamma Parameters
Scale

Shape

Markov Probabilities
P(Wt|Wt-1) P(Wt|Dt-1)
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Jan

13.00

0.46

0.40

0.16

19.2%

-8.8%

-1.9%

5.8%

25.0%

-9.2%

-1.0%

2.7%

Feb

13.01

0.46

0.48

0.16

12.6%

1.5%

0.4%

-0.9%

19.3%

-3.0%

0.4%

0.1%

Mar

15.57

0.41

0.45

0.15

14.0%

-1.2%

0.8%

-1.7%

20.3%

-2.3%

-0.2%

1.0%

Apr

15.85

0.38

0.45

0.15

10.5%

1.8%

-0.1%

0.5%

19.6%

-3.2%

-2.7%

7.3%

May

12.26

0.42

0.44

0.15

12.6%

-5.1%

-3.3%

11.6%

15.7%

-5.4%

-3.6%

11.3%

Jun

21.85

0.21

0.47

0.14

13.3%

-2.4%

-2.4%

7.0%

17.2%

-4.3%

-3.1%

10.3%

Jul

15.73

0.34

0.38

0.15

9.4%

6.4%

-2.8%

8.3%

14.7%

-0.1%

0.0%

-0.8%

Aug

23.61

0.27

0.42

0.15

13.2%

4.2%

0.4%

-1.3%

11.6%

5.9%

0.8%

-4.1%

Sep

21.09

0.33

0.35

0.15

2.7%

6.7%

-3.9%

5.7%

6.7%

5.2%

-2.9%

2.5%

Oct

18.13

0.39

0.32

0.13

14.7%

-7.5%

-9.2%

10.1%

13.7%

-9.9%

-8.4%

10.3%

Nov

16.93

0.43

0.41

0.15

13.6%

-1.5%

-3.7%

9.2%

19.3%

-7.7%

-5.3%

10.5%

Dec

15.65

0.40

0.45

0.16

17.3%

-4.0%

-1.8%

4.1%

23.5%

-7.0%

-2.4%

6.3%

NOTE- Gamma parameters, shape and scale, as well as the Markov chain parameters of wet days were fit to observations from for
1950-1999 by month in mm of rainfall from the Kingston RI weather station. The differences between past (1950-1999) and future
(2050-2099) runs of climate models (both RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5 emission paths) for these same parameters are presented as
adjustments. These % changes were applied to the observed parameters that were then used to create the time series of future
rainfall for climate scenarios. The climate model runs were from the Bureau of Reclamation’s Downscaled CMIP3 and CMIP5
Climate and Hydrology Projections archive (Reclamation, 2013)

FIGURE 1
Scituate Reservoir Watershed, RI

NOTE – The Scituate Reservoir Watershed is 86 square miles and is made
up of five sub-watersheds, which drain into the Scituate Reservoir system,
which is owned and managed by the Providence Water Supply Board
(PWSB). The reservoir system provides water services to 60% of residents
and business of Rhode Island including the municipalities of Providence,
N. Providence, Warwick, E. Providence, Western Cranston, Kent Co., East
Smithfield, Smithfield, Greenville and Lincoln accounting for 92 million
gallons a day (Scituate Reservoir Source Water Assessment 2003). The
Regulating reservoir watershed is highlighted in black.
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FIGURE 2
CDF of Monthly P Concentrations at the Reservoir
Baseline Rainfall Scenario

NOTE- The x-axis represents monthly P concentrations of inflows to the reservoir. The
y-axis is the probability that the reservoir is below that concentration. The two lines
represent the outcome of the minimum and maximum BMP implementation on pasture
land in the watershed. The vertical line is the 50 ppb threshold used as an indicator of a
high risk of algae blooms. The distance between the two lines at the threshold is the
feasible risk levels, which is the x-axis in Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3
Total Costs at Risk Levels
Baseline Rainfall Scenario

NOTE- The solid lines represent the cost of achieving risk levels assuming optimal
policy (solid black), a payment based on the yearly average P reductions as a result of
installed practices (dashed), a flat per acre payment based on the relative BMP
efficiencies (solid grey), but not taking into account other site specific characteristics.
The black dots represent the risk levels and costs assuming standards.
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FIGURE 4
Differences in Acres with BMPs
Risk-Based Compared to Mean-Based

NOTE- The differences in the total amount of acres in the three practices (prescribed grazing,
manure management, nutrient management) are shown between the monthly risk and meanbased objective. The positive acres represent additional acres in practices for optimally
addressing the risk-based objective. The zero line shows the two allocations of BMPs to be the
same and negative implies more acres in practices than under the mean loading objective.
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FIGURE 5
Discrete Differences in Installed BMPs
Risk Versus Mean Allocations
Acres

Risk Level

10

.17

5
0
-5

.16

-10

.15

.14

.13

.12

Farms
NOTE- Discrete changes between the two allocations at various risk levels, sorted
and shaded by their relative size. Each block represents a discrete decision on a farm.
Darker color implies a larger farm added to the risk-based allocation and whiter
color shows a larger farm subtracted from the risk-based objective, or alternatively
thought of as existing in that practice under the mean-based allocation, but not under
the risk-based allocations. There is a shift towards more concentrated BMPs on
larger farms under the monthly risk-based objective.
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FIGURE 6
CDF of Monthly P Concentrations at Reservoir
RCP 6.0 Rainfall Scenario

NOTE- The x-axis represents monthly P concentrations of inflows to the reservoir. The two pairs
of lines represent the minimum (thin) and maximum (thick) effects of BMP implementation on
pasture land in the watershed. The grey lines are from Figure 2 and represent the baseline climate
scenario, while the black lines are from runs of the RCP 6.0 climate change scenario. The climate
scenarios show increased loadings and concentrations above the threshold. The vertical line is the
50 ppb threshold used as an indicator of a high risk of algae blooms. The distance between the
two lines at the threshold is the feasible risk levels, which is the x-axis in Figure 7.
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FIGURE 7
Total Costs at Risk Levels
RCP 6.0 Rainfall Scenario

NOTE- The black solid lines represent the cost of achieving risk levels assuming
optimal policy (black), a payment based on the yearly average P reductions as a
result of installed practices (dashed line), a flat per acre payment based on the
relative BMP efficiencies (grey line), but not taking into account other site specific
characteristics. The black dots represent the risk levels and costs assuming blanket
standards.
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FIGURE 8
Total Cost Curves Under Baseline and Climate Change Rainfall Scenarios
Optimal BMP Allocations

NOTE- This figure shows the minimum cost of achieving risk levels for the baseline and the
two climate change scenarios of rainfall parameters. The black line represents the cost curve
under observed rainfall parameters from 1961-2010 from the Kingston, RI weather station. The
dashed lines represent the least-cost curves resulting from future projections of rainfall for the
years 2050-2099 for the RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5 scenarios.
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Abstract
We introduce a model that incorporates two important elements to groundwater
management: stochasticity and a spatial stock externality. We estimate welfare gains
resulting from optimal management under uncertainty as well as a gradual stock
externality that produces the dynamics of a large aquifer being slowly exhausted.
Using dynamic programming, we incorporate and compare stochasticity for both an
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as well as a Markov chain process for
annual precipitation. We investigate optimal responses for management of
groundwater resources and the importance of these responses as measured by welfare
gains. We find that the spatial depletion of the aquifer is significant to welfare gains
but the inclusion of various forms of uncertainty in rainfall increases estimates only
slightly.
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Introduction
Groundwater plays an important role in mitigating the effect of weather variability on
economic activity. Agriculture, in particular, is highly dependent on rainfall and is
thus uniquely exposed to weather-related risk. Many groundwater aquifers around the
world are stable supplies of water for irrigation to make up for deficits in natural
rainfall. As more than an additional source of water, they act as a water buffer in low
rainfall years. According to the World Bank, it is estimated that 2 billion people
worldwide depend on groundwater for drinking water. In addition, 50% of cereal
production depends on groundwater for irrigation (Wijnen et al. 2012). As a relatively
low cost source of clean water, aquifers are being depleted at an alarming rate in many
places around the world. Groundwater depletion has led to longer pumping heights,
saline intrusion in coastal systems, and land subsidence (United Nations Environment
Programme & Division of Early Warning and Assessment 2003). Aquifers such as the
Indus River plains aquifer on the India-Pakistan boarder, the North China Plain
aquifer, and the High Plains/Ogallala aquifer in the United States are experiencing
declines as society’s reliance on groundwater continues to grow (United Nations
Environment Programme 2012).

Irrigated agricultural plays an important role in reducing the lifespan of many of these
aquifers. For instance, over the Ogallala aquifer, irrigation began in the late 1800’s
but intensified greatly after WWII with the introduction of pivot irrigation systems. As
of 2011, total storage across the aquifer has fallen 8.3% since 1950. This depletion of
the resource has not been spatially uniform across the whole system with some limited
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areas gaining while most areas have faced falling levels. In some places, decreases as
much as 242 feet have been observed, as can be seen in Figure 1 (McGuire 2012). In
western Kansas, areas are left with little or no saturated thickness, and farming is
forced to transition from irrigated crops, mostly corn, to non-irrigated crops such as
sorghum, wheat and cotton (Steward et al. 2013; The Economist 2013). This switch
from high value, stable, irrigated crops to lower value dryland varieties is captured by
the spatial stock dynamics of our model.

As groundwater is depleted, there is a loss in its marginal value due to higher costs of
extraction. This is in addition to a loss of the groundwater stock’s marginal impact in
reducing the variability of returns to farming (Tsur & Tomasi 1991; Knapp & Olson
1995). Despite this buffer value being a potentially large percentage of the total value
of a groundwater resource6, welfare gains estimated when moving from open access to
optimal behavior are relatively small in size, supporting the findings from Gisser and
Sanchez (1980).7 A review of research addressing the curious finding of Gisser &
Sanchez (1980) by Koundouri (2004) presents the range of assumptions and the
welfare gains from management that have been estimated showing the robustness of
Gisser & Sanchez’s result across many settings.

Groundwater is a valuable source in times of drought. Harou et al. (2010) use a
synthetic drought time series based on historic droughts to quantify the statewide
impacts in California based on constraints on optimal monthly flows in a linear
6

Buffer values were estimated at between 5-84% of total value, but a comparison between myopic and
optimal management was not presented (Tsur and Tomasi 1991)
7
Knapp and Olson (1995) find gains to optimal management of 2.6% for Kern County, CA
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programming model. They find that the scarcity value of water increases tenfold under
drought conditions even when optimally managed, although they do not present results
in net present value form. The method implies that the exact time series of rainfall is
perfectly known over the optimal planning horizon, which a stronger assumption then
knowledge of the rainfall process, but not the exact realization. Roseta-Palma &
Xepapadeas (2004) present a more general formulation and use robust control
techniques to estimate optimal groundwater resource use. Precautionary behavior
implies that optimal management under uncertainty results in extraction rates that are
lower to save for future shortcomings than under more certainty in the random process
of rainfall. Welfare effects of optimal versus open access management are not
discussed in this framework, and the results are theoretical and not parameterized to a
groundwater source. Zeitouni (2004) presents results for an aquifer with stochastic
recharge but constant, not rain dependent, demand and constant marginal benefit. This
leads to a bang-bang solution for optimal control and a target groundwater level. In
contrast, our paper will use constant recharge, crop yield functions and duel sources of
water, rainfall and groundwater, in describing the marginal benefit curves, demand,
extraction rules, and resulting stock dynamics.

In addition to uncertainty in rainfall and surface water sources, other papers have
addressed irreversibility and catastrophic loss of a resource. Tsur & Zemel (2004) and
Leizarowitz & Tsur (2012) model the threat of a discrete permanent change in the
system both with certain and uncertain stock dynamics. In specifications of stockdependent event risk, prudence or lower extractions are optimal to save for future
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states, although this does not hold for irreversible exogenous events, which imply
larger extractions than otherwise. In contrast, our paper does not address discrete event
risk or regime changes. We will compare optimal policy and resource savings under
specifications in the rainfall process as well as quantifying the implications to the
externalities associated with open access usage.

Steward et al. (2013) estimates the effect of scenarios of irrigation pumping reductions
on the lifespan of the Ogallala Aquifer as well as crop yields and irrigation supported
cattle over the next century. The study finds certain wells are located in areas of
thinner saturated thickness which supports the current trend of steady increases in the
total yield from dryland compared to irrigated farming across the aquifer.

An

empirical discussion of the relative returns and drought adaptation of irrigated and
dryland farming over the Ogallala can be found in Hornbeck and Keskin (2012).
While they argue that crop adaptation in the long run (extensive margin) can mitigate
some of the negative consequences of losing access to the aquifer through increased
dryland farming, they do not attempt to quantify the welfare impacts when the size of
irrigable land is endogenous and returns are calculated aquifer wide.

The spatial and connected nature of aquifers has been treated in a variety of ways in
the literature. A review of groundwater representations in the economics literature can
be found in Katic (2010). Studies that account for lateral flows of groundwater (Saak
& Peterson 2007; Saak & Peterson 2012; Brozović et al. 2010; Savage & Brozović
2011; Palazzo & Brozović 2014; Guilfoos et al. 2013) have explored the under, or
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over, representation of the pumping height externality when assuming a uniform
single cell aquifer, known as the bathtub model. The specification of this particular
externality is meaningful for welfare analysis since it is the magnitude of the pumping
height externality, when taken into account in optimal management, which results in
welfare gains of optimal extraction. Depending on the spatial and size distribution of
users, welfare gains to management can be over or under estimated when using a
bathtub type model of groundwater. In addition, the degree of the associated
externalities dissipated with increasing degrees of strategic behavior and ownership by
extractors, as pointed out by Brozović et al. (2010) and Guilfoos et al. (2013). A
different, and possibly larger stock externality, that of the depletion of the total spatial
extent of an aquifer, is explored in this paper with a more detailed multi-user spatial
approach put aside for clarity. Simply put, in the model presented, as a groundwater
resource is depleted, so too is the irrigable land lying above with access to the aquifer.
Thus, farm operations on the land that have lost access to groundwater must transition
from irrigated crops to dryland crops.8

We introduce a new economic groundwater model that incorporates the gradual shift
from irrigation to dryland farming as parts of the aquifer run dry. We accomplish this
using an upside down cone to represent the spatial depletion, where the area of
irrigable land above the aquifer shrinks as the water level decreases. Depletion of the
aquifer may interact with uncertainty of the supply of water because the buffer that

8

Koundouri & Christou (2006) show that the value of a backstop, in our case dryland farming, has a
large effect on the magnitude of the welfare gains from management with the addition of a more
valuable backstop attenuating the gains available.
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groundwater provided is no longer available. In this work, we identify the impact of
spatial depletion on welfare gains from optimal management when rainfall is
stochastic and of a Markov process. With this model, we estimate gains from moving
away from current myopic extraction behavior to optimal use of the resource. When
applied to Kansas over a section of the Ogallala Aquifer, we find gains from
management ranging from 2.88% to 3.01% with larger gains achieved under
uncertainty in the rainfall process. These results quantify the importance of the spatial
externality as well as including uncertainty. In the process, we make two contributions
to the literature. First, the introduction of a model that allows for a gradual spatial
externality with a backstop technology of dryland farming, in contrast to other works
that model an abrupt loss of the entire aquifer (Koundouri & Christou 2006). Second,
we estimate the welfare gains from management under various forms of uncertainty to
understand the impact of modeling serial correlation in rainfall. We find that including
the gradual depletion of the aquifer does materially impact welfare results compared to
other estimates of the same region, and surprisingly the serial correlation of rainfall
matters little. Empirically, multi-year droughts combined with the loss of access to the
aquifer only slightly increases welfare gains due to the availability of dryland farming
and the productivity of that option as a backstop when available. The model is
presented in detail below, followed by an empirical application and discussion.

Conceptual Model
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Large groundwater resources, such as the Ogallala, are examples of common pool
resources managed subject to various forms of open access, where, given the
institutions in place, any one user does not have the incentive, or information, to
internalize the externality of their own pumping in reducing water levels over time as
discussed in the literature (Hornbeck & Keskin 2012; Steward et al. 2013; Guilfoos et
al. 2013; Saak & Peterson 2007). As such, groundwater is an acute example of
resource exploitation leading to possibly larger reliance on variable natural rainfall. In
times of drought, this can have large economic consequences. Our model captures the
important interaction of lost access to groundwater and exposure to uncertain rainfall
events.

When dynamics of the loss of irrigable land are included, the buffer value of
groundwater in reducing the variability of profits may be particularly important, as
more farmland is transitioned to dryland, rain dependent farming. The extent to which
groundwater can act as a buffer against variable future rainfall is also a function of the
costs of extraction in a given period, which in this model, is dependent on the stock, or
height of the groundwater. Therefore, with higher levels of groundwater, more can be
extracted across a larger area of farmland to meet demand in realizations of low
rainfall, thus limiting the variability of aquifer-wide profits in any given year. As
groundwater levels fall, so too does the amount available for withdrawal in response to
low rainfall. Therefore, groundwater depletion increases the variance of possible
realizations of aquifer wide profits in subsequent periods. The extent of the welfare
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gain due to optimal management is an empirical question, which we address with an
application.

Spatial Externality

We model the dynamics of how groundwater evolves and access to the resource
changes by introducing a spatial depletion function where the amount of irrigable
farmland above the aquifer is a function of the pumping height (Figure 2). This
specification represents an upside-down cone shape where the area above the
remaining groundwater faces uniform pumping heights, but the area no longer above
the groundwater is left with without any option for irrigation. Doing so creates an
analytical relationship between the amount of water extracted from the aquifer and the
evolution of the height of groundwater and the changing access to groundwater. This
captures the important heterogeneity in groundwater resources’ usable lifespan over
the aquifer. Meaningful lifespans for irrigation pumping are a function of various
location specific factors, including pumping height and saturated thickness, but also
are affected by hydrologic properties of the soils. As such, the chosen function
captures the most at risk areas being exhausted sooner. We have simplified the spatial
externality of lost irrigable acreage by making the percent of remaining irrigable land
a function of simply the pumping height.

Equation (1) defines the percentage of

irrigable land as a function of height, which is bounded by 0 and 1.
(1)
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Where

is the initial groundwater height,

the radius of the circle that is the base of

a cone that represents the irrigable land area above the aquifer. Derivation of equation
(1) can be found in the Appendix. This specification captures both the heterogeneity in
saturated thickness as well as allowing for changes at the extensive margin (switch to
dryland practices). This model is most applicable to areas where the marginal cost of
increased pumping heights is relatively small compared the value of groundwater, or
when the spatial distribution of wells and water demand is relatively uniform. By
simplifying this spatial externality, it allows us to investigate the stochastic dynamics
while keeping the size of the stochastic dynamic programming problem
computationally manageable.

Rainfall Process
There are many ways to model the variability of rainfall, depending on the time and
spatial scale appropriate to the problem (Srikanthan & McMahon 1999). We choose to
model annual rainfall expectations and realizations two ways: the first scenario
assumes independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) realizations of rainfall. There
are

discrete rainfall states,

of next year’s rainfall,

, and corresponding probabilities,

. The probability

, is independent of the current rainfall state,

, thus

.

(2)
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Equation (2) defines expectations when rainfall is i.i.d., where

is the expectation

operator.

However, it is clear that rainfall time series are not serially independent and there
exists many stochastic rainfall generation methods to model the serial dependence
(Srikanthan & McMahon 1999). Therefore, the second scenario presented in this paper
assumes a simple Markov chain process in order to replicate climate persistence,
particularly droughts, where the probabilities of future rainfall states are a function of
the current year’s rainfall. This process defines probabilities of the future state that are
conditional on the current state,

, and

(3)
By specifying the transition probabilities of moving from one state to another, we
capture the time dependent process and the persistence of annual rainfall.

Economic Benefits

In order to estimate the per-acre return to farming, we assumed a section that is
irrigated acreage and a section of farmland that is dryland acreage. The returns to
irrigated land are a function of per-acre yield, price, irrigation pumping cost and the
quantity of irrigation water extracted and applied. Equation (4) gives the per-acre
returns to irrigated farmland.
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(4)
Where

is the per-acre yield,

price of the irrigated crop and

is the irrigation water applied per-acre,
is the lift,

acre foot of groundwater extraction.
compared the surface elevation,

is the

, dependent marginal cost of one

is the elevation of the groundwater level as
Taken together, the cost function gives the

marginal cost of pumping one acre-foot of water to the surface for a given pumping
height. Myopic farmers that irrigate do so to maximize profits in each time period by
choosing

to maximize (4). Farmland that does not have access to the aquifer only

has rainfall as a water input into the production of crops and is represented by,

(5)

Where

is the per-acre yield of dryland crops as a function of rainfall and

the

prices of those crops.

As mentioned before, irrigable farmland is itself a function of pumping height. So a
single period’s aquifer wide return would be the area-weighted sum of irrigated and
dryland profits:
(6)
We assume the homogenous per-acre irrigation water demand across the irrigated
portion of the aquifer, so the total water extracted is:
(7)
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Based on the cumulative extraction

, the groundwater height changes through time

following the equation of motion:
(8)

R is the natural recharge,

the percent of irrigation water returning to the aquifer, A

the total area of the aquifer, S the storitivity and

the percent of irrigated land

over the initial aquifer area from equation (1). This formulation of the equation of
motion has consequences to the rate of depletion. Given a similar per-acre pumping
demand,

, height changes will be smaller under this spatial depletion model than

under the assumption of a traditional bathtub model. This is due to two factors: the
loss of irrigated acreage as the heights fall, and the effect of the change in the
dimensions of the area that the volume of recharge fills. At lower groundwater levels,
a similar volume of recharge will result in a larger positive height change then at
higher levels, due to the shape of the function. A more formal discussion of the
equation of motion is in the Appendix.

The social planner’s problem is to find the extraction path to maximize the discounted
sum of future profits, subject to the equation of motion (8) and physical constrains, as
given here:

(9)
s.t.
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Where

, is the expected value operator over the stochastic rainfall variable,

the discount factor,

the year index and

and

.

is

are the maximum and minimum

groundwater levels. The random nature of rainfall is important in this setting as
groundwater is used to augment natural precipitation in dry years.

either follows the

deterministic, i.i.d scenario, or the Markov chain assumption highlighted above.

Dynamic Programming Problem

Since the objective of this paper is to implement stochastic rainfall to address welfare
gains from optimal management, we use a dynamic programming approach (Bellman
1957). A discussion of dynamic programming as applied to a groundwater setting can
be found in Provencher & Burt (1994). The value function represents the expected
present value of future benefits of the system assuming optimal management in all
future periods.

(10)
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By applying the principle of dynamic programming, the first order conditions for this
problem are given by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this discrete time
stochastic model (Brito 2007).

(11)
Where

is the discount factor equal to

expectation operator over the random variable

, and

the discount rate.

and

is the

the value of next

period’s stock assuming optimal behavior in all subsequent periods.
represents the transition equation as a function of current extraction decisions and
groundwater height, which in our case is the same as equation (8) above.

Intuitively, the optimal extraction of groundwater balances the marginal benefit today
against the discounted marginal benefits in all subsequent time periods given the
expectations of the random variable.

The first order condition with respect to

withdrawals for the Bellman equation above implies the following
(12)

Inputting equations (6 and 8) into equation (12),
(13)
Although we do not know

explicitly, along the optimal path, the marginal value of

extraction today (the first term) should equal the discounted marginal cost (the second
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term) imposed by period ’s extraction. The envelope theorem implies that the
derivative of the value function with respect to the groundwater stock level generally
is:

(14)
Solving for

in (13) and substituting that into equation (14), moving ahead one

period and rearranging terms, we arrive at the discrete time Euler equation, which does
not contain the unknown value function.
(15)

This represents the tradeoff between withdrawals today, the first term, and the
opportunity cost, the part after the equal sign. With our functions,
(16)

The opportunity cost includes many components. The effect of a marginal reduction
of irrigated land is

, where

This captures the

loss at the margin of moving to dryland farming since a drop in water height decreases
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irrigated land. This is multiplied by returns from irrigated agriculture as compared to
dryland farming. These losses are also larger under small realizations of rainfall
because the irrigated production has the ability to increase yields while dryland
farming is a victim of circumstance. The value of the backstop technology plays an
important role in management, since as

grows, or as dryland farming returns

become negligible to irrigated farming returns, the opportunity cost of extraction
increases.

The next term captures the increased pumping cost on returns from irrigated
agriculture
term,

, scaled by how much irrigated land exists. The
captures the future marginal benefit of extraction divided by the

marginal change to the height of water. This is the pumping height externality when
not accounted for by extractors. This is multiplied by,

,

which is the

additional marginal effect of the change in height on future extraction benefits and
captures the effect on the changing irrigated acreage through

, as well as the

effects on height through recharge.

It may be helpful to compare this model to a special case; if we assume
is constant, and

and

, we have the bathtub model which is the extreme case where

there is no spatial depletion and no backstop technology available. This case matches
other models used in the literature (Gisser and Sanchez 1980, Feinermann and Knapp
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1983). Using these restrictive assumptions gives us the equivalent to equation (16) for
the bathtub model.

(17)

We can see the term

, appears in equation (16) but not (17)

and is positive when

, implying an additional opportunity cost of extraction

over the bathtub model. The term in equation (16),

, represents the

additional impact on future benefits from the change in the water table in the spatial
depletion model. If this is greater than unity it provides an additional cost in the spatial
depletion model compared to the bathtub model. It is unclear if this term is always
greater than one and provides an addition cost to extraction compared to the bathtub
model. It is clear that when

is larger that there are greater costs than when

is smaller given assumption about the rate of depletion.9 However, a result of
the cone assumption is that as the water height is lower in the aquifer, a similar
recharge will result in a larger height change due to the reduced size of the volume it is
filling. Therefore, the total effect of adding the spatial externality is a matter of
parameterization.

9

The key assumption here would be that the second derivative of the depletion function is constant, and
the rate of change in irrigable area were constant, then the costs of the change are higher when γ(x)is
relatively large because it only enters in the numerator of equation (16).
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Solving equation (11) means finding the function

either explicitly or

numerically. The addition of a stochastic element and a non-linear spatial depletion
function makes analytic solution intractable in this case (Brito 2007). For the example
below, we turn to the numerical method of value function iteration. Total welfare
gains from management are calculated by differencing the present value of the system
from the initial groundwater level to reaching the steady state under both optimal and
myopic behavior. Myopic behavior is used to simulate perfect competition, as farmers
would behave as if they do not expect to have the rights to the future benefits of water
savings in the current period due to open access properties of the aquifer. Therefore,
this behavior is simulated as solving one period’s profit maximization problem,
maximizing (6) with respect to withdrawals, with no regard to future states by
equating marginal benefit to marginal cost for each period sequentially.

Empirical Model

We quantify welfare gains in this spatial depletion model under uncertainty with an
application to the Northwest Kansas section of the Ogallala aquifer. The Kansas Water
Authority provided the physical parameters of the aquifer (hydraulic conductivity,
recharge, storativity). The pumping cost estimates from this region are taken from
Hendricks & Peterson (2012) for groundwater management district 4 in Kansas. We
estimate the crop yield response to applied water using Kansas State’s Crop Yield
Predictor tool for a variety of crops to estimate irrigated and dryland returns to crops
under various rainfall scenarios.
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The physical parameters of the model are presented in Table 1. The spatial externality
is modeled using the function in equation (1), which captures the loss of irrigated
acreage as groundwater levels fall. The initial aquifer area is set at 2.19 Million acres,
of which 373,200 acres are irrigated or 17% of the total land. We assume that this total
acreage of farmland (irrigated plus dryland) remains constant as the aquifer area is
depleted. A discussion of the implications of allowing the amount of farmland to vary
is found in the discussion.

The bottom of the aquifer is set at 2,892 feet above sea level based on the minimum
water table found over management district 4. The initial water level was set at 3,069
feet based on the irrigated acreage and initial pumping height to the surface of 26 feet,
which is the average across management district 4. The depth of the aquifer and initial
total acreage surface area make up the two physical parameters needed to define the
cone shaped function used to capture the spatial depletion, Figure 1. As discussed in
equation (16) above, the gradient of this function describing depletion has implications
to the optimal extraction time path, as it defines the magnitude of the marginal cost of
lost irrigated acreage due to a change in groundwater height, or our spatial externality.

To estimate crop yields as a function of rainfall and applied irrigation water, we used
Kansas State’s Crop Yield Predictor tool, which is parameterized for the Colby, KS
area (Klocke et al. 2010). We fit functions for corn, sorghum and winter wheat. By
running the tool for the full range of water applied to crops and rainfall, we estimated
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per-acre yield as a function of rainfall, or rainfall plus irrigation water applied. The
assumption used here is that an inch of rainfall is equivalent to an inch of irrigation
water applied. We fit cubic functions to the yield data. Visually, the yield functions are
found in Figure 3. Corn is assumed grown on irrigated acreage and a rotation of wheat,
fallow, sorghum, fallow on dryland acreage (Hansen et al. 2012). Thus, the crop yields
from dryland are assumed to be 1/3 of the per-acre sorghum yield at a particular
rainfall plus 1/3 wheat. This assumes that in any year, various dryland farms, which
are represented as homogenous, are at various stages of the rotation. Prices were
obtained from USDA ERS Yearbook Tables and average US prices in 2013/2014 were
used in the parameterization and simulation (USDA ERS 2014).

Expectations of rainfall play an important role in defining optimal management. The
model presented is flexible to various definitions of rainfall expectations and
stochastic processes. For clarity of interpretation and limiting the computational
burden, we chose to use three, roughly equally likely, levels of rainfall representing
low, medium and high amounts of yearly rainfall10. We fit an empirical timehomogenous11 Markov chain process to binned rainfall amounts to match the low,
medium, and high levels to observed rainfall at the Colby, KS gauge. The transition
probability matrix and details are found in Table 2.

10

Yearly rainfall is the input to the Crop Yield Predictor. From there, a weather generator is used to
create growing season weather to estimate crop yield.
11
This implies a stationary distribution and constant transition matrices. By simulating this process for
250,000 years, we estimated the non-conditional probabilities of each state, which are used for our
stochastic case, as well as the average of the process for the deterministic treatment to match the
conditions for each scenario for comparison.
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Numerical Solutions

Optimal policy functions are found numerically by means of stochastic dynamic
programming using MATLAB 2013. The optimal extraction decisions as a function of
water level are approximated by first estimating the value function,

, by means of

value function iteration by solving equation (11) for discrete levels of , replacing the
optimized values for

and repeating until the functions converge within a

specified tolerance (Putterman 1994). Creating the transition probability matrix for
each realization of rainfall incorporates the Markov chain yearly rainfall process.
Once the optimal value functions are found, the corresponding policy functions can be
recovered for any realization of rainfall and groundwater height. The value function
and policy function are displayed in Figure 5 and 6.

The derived optimal decision rules are iterated through time starting at the initial
groundwater levels. Realizations of rainfall in each year are generated from the i.i.d or
the Markov process fitted above to yearly rainfall to match expectations used for
transition probabilities. To evaluate gains from optimal management, a myopic
decision is made in each year by using the policy of maximizing equation (6) for each
year with respect to groundwater withdrawals. These paths through time for the i.i.d
case can be found in Figure 6.

The welfare implications of making optimal extraction decisions are estimated by
discounting and summing each year’s profit as defined by equation (6) from the initial
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year to the end of the time horizon, in our case 500 years, which is well after reaching
a steady state and where future benefits are essentially discounted to zero. The
differences between the two welfare values calculated are the estimated gains from
optimal management of the aquifer. The results are presented in Table 3 for different
specifications of the problem.

Results
We present results from our model applied to the characteristics of groundwater
management district 4. The welfare results can be found in Table 3 under the various
rainfall assumptions. Gains exist from management in the range of 2.88-3.01%. The
stochastic scenarios generate slightly larger relative gains (.09-.13% larger), reflecting
the magnitude of including stochasticity in assessing welfare impacts to management.
A point found in the literature, reflecting the additional value of groundwater found by
previous studies under uncertainty (Knapp & Olson 1995; Tsur & Graham-Tomasi
1991; Provencher & Burt 1993).

The results show that including the loss of the spatial extent of the aquifer leads to a
larger estimated welfare losses when compared to other modeling assumptions for
welfare impact studies over parts of the Ogallala. To put our work into perspective,
our estimates are larger than Lee et al (1981) for the Ogallala in Texas at .3%,
Nieswiadomy (1985) for the High plains aquifer in Texas at .28%, and similar to Kim
et al. (1989) also for the High plains in Texas (1-3.7%). Kim’s paper includes
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endogenous technological change as a function of groundwater heights and therefore
similarly provides backstop technologies in a sense, albeit under certainty.
The welfare gains arise from the difference between the optimal decision rules, and
the myopic pumpers’ choices, Figure 5. The optimal planner internalizes the intertemporal stock externality, while the myopic extractor does not. For the stochastic
rainfall scenarios, the realized rainfall determines the corresponding optimal policy
function, one for each state of rainfall. As compared to the myopic decision maker,
withdrawals following optimal management are about 16% less in low rainfall, 19%
less in medium rainfall, and 25% less in high rainfall, varying through groundwater
heights (Figure 5) showing relatively larger savings in better years. When these
optimal policy functions are iterated through time (Figure 6) meaning the decisions are
made optimally based on the current rainfall and groundwater state, the groundwater
stock is depleted more slowly under optimal decisions, as expected.

The lower optimal extractions, in equivalent groundwater heights and rainfall amounts
compared to the myopic pumper, leads the groundwater levels to settle at a steady
state height of 2,991 feet on average as opposed to 2,980 feet under myopic
extractions for a difference of 11 feet in height at the steady state and between 0 and
17.5 feet through the time-path. With our spatial cone model, where the irrigated
acreage is a function of the groundwater height, these steady state groundwater levels
translate to an optimal steady state with 118,360 irrigated acres or 31% of the initial
irrigated acreage, as opposed to 93,517 irrigated acres under myopic extraction or 25%
of the initial irrigated acreage. The sources of welfare losses are the higher pumping
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costs with deeper water tables and the loss of irrigated acres. The magnitude of these
losses is less obvious as they depend on the rate of depletion, the discount rate, and the
relative benefits of irrigated farmland as compared to dryland farming.

When comparing welfare across rainfall scenarios, modeling uncertainty increases
estimated gains from management, resulting in an increase in welfare gains of .09.13% over the deterministic welfare gains. The concavity of the one year benefit
function implies risk aversion in the sense that irrigation water limits the range of
available water in future years, which is preferred over a wider range of possible states
as described in Provencher & Burt (1993) and under risk aversion in Knapp & Olson
(1996). However, the yield of the backstop technology of dryland farming is less
variable (flatter in Figure 3) than irrigated crop yields. In a sense, the transition to
dryland farming attenuates the loss of the buffer value of the groundwater, as the crops
are more resilient to a range of rainfall then non-irrigated corn would be. Overall, the
increase in welfare gains when including uncertainty reflects the additional benefit
gained when taking into account groundwater as a steady resource to buffer variation
in weather in optimal management.

The groundwater height remains higher through time when taking into account
uncertainty in precipitation as the optimal policy consists of slightly smaller
extractions on average. The average difference in height is small and only around 1
foot, well within the margin of error of the simulation runs. Clearly, the year-to-year
extractions are different in the stochastic cases from the deterministic case, where
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optimal policy functions imply changing policy rules based on yearly rainfall, Figure
5. So, although the extraction paths are similar in average groundwater height, the
stochastic case leads to variable extractions and a range of groundwater levels
depending on the realization of rainfall (Figure 6). The addition of a Markov chain
process added little additional welfare gains (.04%) when optimal policy was matched
to a stochastic process as described in Table 2.

Discussion

Unlike other approaches, our spatial depletion model captures the gradual loss of
access to a stabilizing resource as a result of the overall extraction of the aquifer. The
imbedded assumption of infinite conductivity results in uniform pumping heights
across the irrigated acreage above the remaining aquifer, representing the average
height faced by the remaining pumpers. The intertemporal pumping height externality,
assuming infinite conductivity, is relatively small when the marginal pumping cost as
a function of height is low compared to the marginal benefit of groundwater extraction
(Koundouri 2004). Thus, the important externality to welfare is the loss of access over
time as certain areas have thinner saturated thickness than others and, even with a
relatively short pumping height, can loose access as a result of the aquifer wide
extractions, Figure 7. When simulating the aquifer under the assumption of the
standard bathtub model, the estimated welfare gains are small, .06% (Appendix Table
1).
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That modeling the loss of irrigated acreage does not result in significantly larger
welfare losses than what we found was unexpected, although our welfare estimates are
larger than those found over similar regions in previous literature. We include a
backstop technology, dryland farming, which reduces the gains from management,
since in its absence, we would have assumed infinitely expensive alternatives
(Koundouri & Christou 2006). Without a backstop, the welfare gains from
management are larger at 5.2% in the stochastic rainfall scenario (Appendix Table 1).
We chose to model the dryland crop as a rotation of sorghum, wheat, and fallow in
equal proportions. Dryland practices require fallowing some areas and rotations of
other crops to maintain soil conditions. We assumed no loss of total farmland, when
some land may have to be fallowed permanently after losing access due to its soil
characteristics, which may cause us to overstate the value of the backstop technology.
Advances in dryland techniques and drought resistant crops could mitigate some of the
negative consequences to losing irrigation access, but even as dryland techniques gain
efficiency, so too will the returns to irrigated agriculture and it is unclear if the relative
value difference will change much (Steward et al. 2013).

Second, our model assumes that 17% of the initial aquifer surface area is irrigated
farmland (Table 1). This is based on the observed number of acres farmed over this
district. The total surface area of the usable aquifer, or initial irrigation intensity, may
vary widely across aquifers or regions within an aquifer. The results are particularly
sensitive to the intensity of farming, or the amount of farming relative to the size of
the resource, with a higher percent of acres irrigated leading to larger welfare gains
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from management (Appendix Figure 1). This suggests that intensely farmed areas or
aquifers may have a magnitude of difference in gains from optimal management.

In exploring the implication of the above assumptions, we can say something about
when management is likely to have a greater welfare gain. When the value of the
backstop technology is small compared to the value of the use with access to the
water, the welfare gains are larger. Koundouri and Christou (2006) made this point
with a backstop of desalinization under certainty and we can see this analytically in
our model and discussion of equation (16). Under uncertainty, the backstop
technology’s benefit of reducing variability also plays a role given the concavity of the
benefit function implying risk aversion. A less variable backstop may have more value
than one of similar average value but more variable returns and result in smaller gains
to management, although this is not proven here.

We also held prices constant through the time horizon, but adding demand growth for
the irrigated crop would certainly increase the welfare gains, similar to what is shown
in Brill & Bruness (1994). There may be important price dynamics in large aquifers
that support large monocultures, as irrigation water dries up the prices of irrigated
crops should increase and the opposite market forces would be in play for dryland
crops. These forces would increase the gains from management as the marginal
benefits from irrigated agriculture would increase compared to dryland agriculture.
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Our motivation in including uncertainty was that groundwater has a value as a buffer
to smooth out returns over time (Tsur & Graham-Tomasi 1991; Knapp & Olson 1995).
With a backstop that does not enjoy the stable source of groundwater, we surmised the
two aspects together could lead to additional welfare gains from moving away from
myopic pumping. Despite the small additional percentage gains from management, a
few points can be made from interpreting the optimal rules under uncertainty. The
optimal extractions vary year to year, so any management designs to approximate the
optimal extractions would need to allow for this variability as rules based on a
deterministic optimal solution would limit welfare beneficial pumping in dry years and
similarly be too high to induce optimal saving in better years (Figure 5).

The groundwater stock paths are similar under uncertainty and certainty on average,
but vary in the stochastic cases, shown Figure 6. The gains from management could be
small and similar to the deterministic case or larger than the average depending on the
realization of rainfall, only one of which the resource would actually progress through
in reality.

We included a Markov process to investigate if the type of stochastic rainfall process
mattered to welfare gains to management, as this is not something that has been
discussed to our knowledge. We find that changing the process mattered little to the
estimated gains from management, although it changed the optimal policy rules. In our
case it slightly increased extractions in each rainfall state, in each groundwater level
although the differences are well within the modeling uncertainty. Given that adding
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uncertainty in general added less than a quarter percent to welfare gains, finer
distinctions, such as defining a different process, did not materially matter.

In our model, we simplified droughts with a Markov chain rainfall process where the
lengths of the droughts were defined by the transition probabilities. Drought refers to
extended periods of lower than normal soil moisture as a result of climatic variables
including rainfall (used in this paper), temperature, and even wind speed. Drought
measures such as the Palmer Drought Severity Index include a duration aspect, where
the progressions of the climatic variables matter and not just the current conditions.
We do not carry over soil conditions or other stock variables, except the groundwater
height, that could be affected by the series of yearly rainfall events. This could be done
by modeling additional processes in the benefit function and is left for future work.
The addition of the lagged process mattered little to the welfare gains from
management and only slightly to the optimal policy functions in our application.

The discussion of rainfall processes leads to an important point about the assumptions
leading to the optimal paths. We matched the rainfall processes to the optimal policy
rules in each case assuming perfect information about the process that generates the
annual rainfall. Any policy rules would be such that the process is not known with
certainty. The method we chose to use to estimate optimal management assumes that
the decision makers not only act optimally in each period given the realization of
rainfall, but also have accurate expectations of the process that generates rainfall. In
reality, the processes that generate weather and longer-term climate trends are
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complex and the distribution of rainfall is not stationary. As such, the extent to which
the policy maker’s expectation of rainfall coincides with the actual process may have
implications to welfare gains, with mistakes or mis-specifications causing possibly
large welfare losses.

Conclusion

We introduce a dynamic spatial depletion model of groundwater extraction that
incorporates stochastic rainfall and a gradual spatial stock externality, leaving more
farmland at the mercy of variable rainfall as groundwater levels fall and less available
for irrigation across a smaller area. By building a novel model flexible to rainfall
expectations and various stochastic processes, we showed the extent of the importance
to welfare and optimal management when including stochastic elements. We also
explore the implication of droughts and their persistence on optimal management as it
compares to myopic extraction behavior.

We find that the addition of randomness

and persistence of rainfall does not materially affect welfare gains, largely due to the
relatively good yields from dryland farming. Incorporating the spatial depletion of the
aquifer added to welfare estimates of moving from open access to optimal
management of the resource.
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Tables and Figures
TABLE 1
Parameter values for Northwest Kansas Groundwater Management District 4
Parameter
C1
R
A

S
x0
β
r

p

Description
Cost of pumping
Natural recharge
Aquifer area
Initial Irrigated acres
Land surface
Lower aquifer bound
Storativity
Irrigation water return
Initial water level
Discount factor
Rainfall states
High
Medium
Low
Crop Prices
Corn
Sorghum
Winter Wheat

Value
$.11 /a-ft/ft
199,040 a-ft
2.19 million acres
373,200 acres
3094 ft above sea-level
2892 ft above sea-level
.17
20%
3068 ft above sea-level
.96%
2 ft
1.58 ft
1.25 ft
$4.45 /bushel
$4.25 /bushel
$6.53 /bushel

Note- The physical parameters of the aquifer are provided by the Kansas Water Authority. The
pumping cost estimates from this region are taken from Hendricks & Peterson (2012) for groundwater
management district 4 in Kansas. Prices were obtained from USDA ERS Yearbook Tables and average
US prices in 2013/2014 were used in the parameterization and simulation (USDA ERS 2014).
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TABLE 2
Markov Chain Transition Probability Matrix
Future State
Low – 1.25 ft
Med – 1.58 ft
High - 2 ft

Low
40.48%
30.95%
28.57%

Current State

Non-conditional

Med
21.62%
37.84%
40.54%

35.29 %
31.10 %
33.61 %

High
42.50%
25.00%
32.50%

NOTE- Low Med and High refer to the annual precipitation events.
Probabilities are empirically found from a precipitation time series from
Colby, KS. The last column represents the non-conditional (on current state)
probabilities of future rainfall used in the i.i.d. stochastic scenario.
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TABLE 3
Welfare Gains From Groundwater Management
Total Discounted Profit (Billion $)
Deterministic
Stochastic
Stochastic -MC

Perfect Competition
$ 6.683

Optimal Policy
$ 6.876

Difference
$ .193

% Gain
2.88

$ 6.589
(.0937)
$ 6.515
(.0408)

$ 6.785
(.0938)
$6.711
(.0350)

$ .196
(.006)
$.196
(.006)

2.97
(.04)
3.01
(.03)

NOTE- Standard errors of the stochastic figures from 100 iterations through rainfall realizations are in
parentheses. The deterministic scenario assumes average annual rainfall each year. Stochastic assumes i.i.d.
random draws from high, average, low rainfall state based on empirical probabilities. Stochastic- MC
assumes draws from a Markov chain process where the transition probabilities are found in TABLE 2.
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Model
FIGURE 1
• Shrinking BathtubSpatial
(snow-cone?)
Depletion Model

2u

p

x
θ
u
NOTE – u is the radius of the irrigated acreage, x the groundwater height
and p is the pumping height, which is the difference between the surface
and the height of the groundwater. Θ is fixed given the parameters x, p,
and u.
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FIGURE 2
Water Level and Storage Change in the High Plains Aquifer
Predevelopment (1950) to 2011

(McGuire 2012)
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FIGURE 3
Crop Yield Functions
Bushels per-acre

NOTE- Derived from Kansas State University’s Crop Yield Predictor.
Low, medium and high rainfall amounts are shown as vertical lines. The
Y-axis represents yield in terms of bushels per-acre as a function of
rainfall for sorghum and winter wheat, or rainfall plus irrigation water for
corn.
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FIGURE 4
Optimal Value Functions

NOTE- This figure plots the optimal value functions for the
stochastic (one for each realization of rainfall). The value
function represents the net present value of the groundwater
resource assuming optimal future management.
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FIGURE 5
Optimal Policy Functions at Groundwater Heights
i.i.d. Rainfall

NOTE- The three states of rainfall (Low, Medium, High) each has a corresponding policy
function represented by the three colors. At low levels of rainfall, demand for irrigation
water is higher. The dotted lines represent the decisions made by a myopic extractor,
while the solid lines are results of the optimal dynamic programming policy functions.
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FIGURE 6
Groundwater Height Over Time
i.i.d Rainfall

NOTE- The blue lines represent groundwater levels under optimal
management. The average (thicker line), standard deviation (blue shaded
region) and a number of individual runs are plotted. The red is the myopic
planner’s groundwater heights through time.
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FIGURE 7
Estimated Usable Lifetime of Ogallala in Kansas

NOTE- From Kansas Geological Survey (2009). The 1998-2008 trends of
depletion were extrapolated to estimate useable lifespan.
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Abstract
This paper empirically estimates the effect of an increase in natural gas pipeline
capacity in New England on monthly equilibrium natural gas prices and quantities for
the electric energy sector. The cost of natural gas has important consequences to the
wellbeing and cost of living for millions of customers either relying directly on natural
gas for heating, or electric energy consumers indirectly. I present results of reduced
form price and quantity regressions using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) followed
by results of a dynamic simultaneous equation model (SEM) of the market system.
Using derived empirical relationships, prices and quantities for natural gas are
estimated under various weather scenarios as well as under current and expanded
capacity to highlight the role capacity has in effecting the variability of the price of
energy to the region.
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Introduction

Natural gas is increasingly being used for electric energy power generation across the
United States. This trend is driven by increased domestic production from shale gas as
well as regional environmental initiatives. For the Northeastern United States, it has
meant a shift from oil and coal-fired generation towards natural gas. Since 2001,
annual power generation from natural gas has increased from 17% of total MWh
produced to as much as 36% in 2015 (EIA 2013; EIA 2014). Depending on the
season, this increase in demand from electric energy generators is competing with
other uses for natural gas in the Northeast, such as residential heating and industrial
consumption. While demand has increased across all sectors, delivery capacity for
natural gas is at times constrained, especially in New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI,
VT) with nearly all the physical capacity under contract in certain winter months and
available supplies for variable or unexpected demand, such as in especially cold winter
months, only available at high prices (DOE 2013). Because they are particularly
reliant on the share of capacity that is not under firm contract, natural gas generators
are exposed to volatile fuel costs at the same times when electric power demands are
high. In turn, the electricity market passes these fuel costs on to electric utilities and
from there to electric power consumers.

The seasonal scarcity issue is being addressed with new capacity in the form of new
pipelines and pipeline upgrades, some of which are already in use and a number of
which are planned to come online over the coming years (EIA 2013). However, the
pipelines are controversial both for their impact on the planned routs and the implicit
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support of the controversial production process of hydraulic fracturing, as is evident
from recent news reports (Marc Levy 2014; Jay Fitzgerald 2014; Ailworth 2013).

This paper will empirically estimate the effect of an increase in natural gas pipeline
capacity in New England on monthly equilibrium natural gas prices and quantities for
the electric sector. Weather plays an important role in defining the demand for natural
gas, due to natural gas’s use for heating and electricity generation in the winter and
through electricity demand for cooling in the summer. The cost of natural gas has
important consequences to the wellbeing and cost of living for millions of customers
either relying directly on natural gas for heating, or indirectly through electric energy
consumption. This paper presents results of reduced form price and quantity
regressions using Generalized Least Squares (GLS), followed by results of a dynamic
simultaneous equation model (SEM) of the market system. Using derived empirical
relationships, prices and quantities for natural gas will be estimated under various
weather scenarios as well as under current and expanded capacity to highlight the role
capacity has in affecting the variability of the price of energy to the region. This work
adds to the literature by providing empirical evidence and the quantification of the
effect of constrained pipeline supply in an important energy market, where weather
conditions, multiple demand sectors and alternative fuels determine the cost of energy.

Background
Natural gas in New England is used by the residential, commercial, industrial and
electric sectors. Total yearly consumption has increased from 710,000 to 868,000
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MMcf from 2001 to 2014, with the largest percent and total volume gains from electric
energy generation (Figure 1). This increased consumption came partly as a result of
decreasing prices from a plentiful supply of domestic natural gas due to the
technological advances in extraction using hydraulic fracturing and horizontal well
drilling (DOE 2013; DOE 2015). For power generation, this has meant the addition of
natural gas fired turbines to replace retiring coal and nuclear facilities. Figure 2 shows
electric generation by fuel type for New England, showing natural gas replacing coal
over the time frame. The total energy generation has remained mostly constant.

The demand for natural gas is highly seasonal and closely correlated with heating and
cooling needs. The overall quantity consumed across all sectors peaks in the winter
months. However, the electric sector follows a different seasonal pattern. The
residential, commercial and industrial sectors use natural gas in higher volumes in the
winter for heating, while the electric sector uses more in the summer for meeting
cooling demand and less in the winter due to higher spot prices and fuel oil as an
available substitute for many generators (Figure 1).

Pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure must be sized to meet the
needs of the peak demand in the winter, and therefore runs below capacity for the
other parts of the year. New England receives natural gas through pipelines that carry
it from producing regions in Canada and states to the west such as Tennessee and
Pennsylvania. The major pipelines are the Algonquin Gas Transmission, which
connects to supplies coming from the South, the Tennessee Gas Pipeline, which runs
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from the Gulf of Mexico through the producing regions of Pennsylvania and Ohio, and
the Maritimes and Northeast pipeline from Canada. In addition, imports of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) from overseas come through facilities located around Boston. As
there are no major storage sites in New England, the area relies on storage and
outflows from the states to the west and LNG imports to meet unexpected demand.

Pipeline customers can be divided into two types: those with firm delivery contracts
for a specified capacity, and those that have interruptible contracts for pipeline
capacity and the associated gas volumes. Residential and many commercial customers
are serviced by local distribution companies (LDCs), utilities who have long-term
contracts with the pipeline for capacity to guarantee supply to their customers (DOE
2014). To a lesser extent, industrial users also enter into longer-term agreements for
supply, resulting in higher average but less volatile prices. Electric energy generators,
on the other hand, generally do not enter into long-term contracts. Their supply is
interruptible for a number of regulatory as well as economic reasons explained below.
Therefore, the price the generators pay for natural gas varies greatly and a stable
supply is at risk in times of high constraint in the system. The prices across sectors can
be seen in Figure 3.

Pipeline owners operate in a highly regulated market, where the price charged for
capacity is capped by the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee (FERC) in order to
counteract the monopoly power and protect customers (EIA 2015a). However, firm
capacity contract holders can sell their owned capacity and volume of gas in an
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unregulated secondary market. These transactions are made between buyer and seller
and are not cleared through a market entity. As laid out in Oliver and Mason, et al.
(2014) and Oliver and Finnoff, et al. (2014), capacity constraints lead to higher spot
prices in constrained demand regions and higher price spreads between pipeline nodes.
Therefore, additional rents are made available for firm capacity contract holders with
the existence of the secondary market.

In New England, these firm contract holders are the utilities and large industrial users.
Why electric generators have not sought more firm supplies is unclear. Ideas put
forward include the availability of alternative fuels for generation (oil), the inability to
store gas or electric energy, the ability to pass the higher spot costs along in liberalized
electric energy market, the lower average price received from more interruptible
contracts in the summer, and issues of counterparty risk due to the heterogeneity in
sizes of gas producers and electric energy consumers (Morris 2013; ISO New England
2015). Generators may enter more long-term agreements over time, but it is currently
clear that the electric energy sector pays significantly higher prices for natural gas in
times of constraint due to the market structure described above.

Constraints are prominent in the winter months when heating needs and natural gas for
generating electricity compete for relatively scarce capacity. The severity of the winter
in terms of low temperatures determines to what extent the pipeline constraint is
binding. Particularly cold winter seasons, when combined with constrained supply,
have led to high prices in the recent past, particularly the winters of 2012/2013 and
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2013/2014. Monthly average prices for natural gas in the electric sector were as high
as 18.52 $/Mcf in the winter for 2012/13 and 21.95 $/Mcf in the winter of 2013/14,
when the long-term average is 6.65 $/Mcf overall and between 8 and 9 $/Mcf in
December, January and February. Historically it is December, January and February
when the constraints are the highest. The exposure of the region’s energy costs to risks
from colder then average winters influences both the cost of living and the cost of
doing business. Using empirical relationships fit to the years 2002-2014 for natural gas
prices paid by the electric sector, a simulation is created to estimate price and
consumption as a function of planned pipeline capacity improvements for New
England under a range of possible winter temperatures.

There is a vast literature of modeling approaches to estimate natural gas price
relationships across a multitude of markets. Early approaches focused on end users’
costs and substitutability between energy sources using panel and system of equation
approaches to identify the elasticities of interest. A review of this early work is
presented in Al-Sahlawi (1989). In that time, demand was inelastic over the short
term, yet elastic over the longer run, and closely related to the price of substitutes,
namely oil. Given the simultaneity and endogeneity issues in estimating price
elasticities in a supply and demand system, simultaneous equation models (SEM) and
variations of instrumental variable approaches were used for identification of price
elasticity and fuel substitution effects (Zellner & Palm 1974).
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While these methods lead to a deeper understanding of the long-term drivers of natural
gas prices, fundamental factors of supply and demand, such as weather and storage,
which can be important at a national and certainly a regional level were largely
attributed to unexplained noise. Mu (2007), used a reduced form approach to model
equilibrium prices for natural gas contracts based on the Henry Hub spot price, to
show that both weather and storage deviations from normal levels are important
determinants in both the average price as well as in explaining changes in daily price
volatility. Both changes in weather and surprise weekly storage announcements were
important in explaining the price dynamics of this particular natural gas price. Since
many financial derivative contracts are based on the Henry Hub price, the work is
relevant for that financial market, but modeling these financial derivative prices in
Chicago tells us little about the prices for the final consumers of natural gas and little
about the prices for the New England region.

Endogeneity between prices, quantities and other fundamental factors, such as gas
storage, makes estimating the structural parameters of demand and supply tricky. Time
series methods have been employed, including variations of the ARIMA models or
VAR (vector autoregressive) models for the case of multiple time series when the
equilibrium price and quantity are the variables of economic interest and not
necessarily estimates of structural parameters. A number of papers (Nick & Thoenes
2013; Marmer et al. 2007; Brown & Yücel 2008) present VAR approaches, where
they include weather and storage to test previous findings of the relationship between
oil prices and natural gas prices. They find that, when accounting for these factors in
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the VAR framework, oil prices maintain their prominent role in explaining natural gas
price movements. With these modeling approaches, none of the identification issues
are resolved and the parameter estimates are predicated on the idea that all the
variables are endogenous to the system. The coefficient estimates represent
quantification of the time path of the effects of an unexpected shock of one of the
variables of interest on others in the system that is assumed to be moving towards
equilibrium. The VAR approach is less helpful in investigating long-term relationships
or structural drivers or a permanent change in one of the included variables. For
example, the marginal changes are an estimate of the shock working through each
variable simultaneously. An exception to this drawback is if any of the variables are
deemed to be co-integrated. Cointegration refers to the property between two or more
non-stationary variables, where there exists a consistent relationship between the
levels of the variables. This property can be tested by regressing one against another
and ending up with a stationary error term (Murray 1994). For example, this is the
case for the Henry Hub natural gas price and the WTI price for crude oil found in
Brown & Yücel (2008). Because of this they were able to estimate a long run
relationship between the two.

The Henry Hub price is important for many financial contracts and represents the spot
price of natural gas in the most liquid market in the US. The difference between this
spot price and the price paid by end users in each region has been the topic of a
number of studies. Since the 1970s, the market for natural gas has undergone a
number of rounds of deregulation. By 1989, wellhead price ceilings had been
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removed. Resultant regional natural gas spot markets emerged and an interstate
network of pipelines developed. In 1992, pipelines were required to provide “openaccess” transportation, separating the pipeline owners’ ability to sell the commodity
and the transportation capacity together (Apergis et al. 2015). De Vany & Walls
(1993) argued that a measure of the extent of integration is to test the level of
cointegration between wellhead prices and spot markets separated by a pipeline
system. They found that in 1987, before the deregulation, cointegration relationships
did not exist between most wellheads and spot prices. By 1991, more than 65% had
become cointegrated as a result of the deregulation according to the authors.
Subsequent studies have used this idea and tested the effect of deregulation and
connectedness on the co-integration of a number of price series (Walls 1993; Apergis
et al. 2015; Arano & Velikova 2010). They each find that deregulation led to a more
integrated market where prices are functionally related to each other in the long run.
To what extent pipeline capacity works to increase or decrease the level of integration
is not addressed. These papers also do not address a marginal change in capacity on a
region’s prices or consumption. Arano & Velikova (2010), for example, ask if citygate
(the price the local utilities pay) and residential prices are cointegrated within a state.
They find that they are related in the long run post-deregulation supporting the thesis
that deregulation has led to better market integration. However, Marmer et al. (2007)
use similar cointegration tests to identify constrained regions, whose price time series
deviate from long-term relationships with the Henry Hub spot price. Surprisingly, they
find that California is the most isolated and that there were no bottlenecks into the
Northeast. The constrained conditions have been more recent, while their study’s data
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covers 1988-2003. In any case, the methods in the paper would not allow for an
estimate of a marginal change in pipeline capacity on price and quantity.

Imposing more structure on a VAR system, typically by limiting directions of
causality between variables, allows for estimates of a selection of structural
relationships as well as estimates of the transient shock effects estimated from the
VAR model. This approach is known as the Structural Vector Auto Regression
(SVAR). Nick & Thoenes (2013) present an SVAR model for the German natural gas
market. They find that supply side shocks may be overstated when viewed in a model
that includes a more comprehensive account for other explanations of price
movements, namely abnormal demand scenarios (particularly cold winters). Market
fundamentals of storage and weather are found to be significant explanatory variables
of the respective natural gas prices that the authors sought to model. While unexpected
shocks are important to understand, they tell us little about a permanent change in
supply, such as the addition of pipeline capacity to a region.

A recent report prepared for the Department of Energy uses a proprietary modal and
agent based model from Deloitte consulting to estimate longer-term (15-year) national
and regional prices under various demand scenarios (DOE 2015; Deloitte Center for
Energy Solutions 2015). The report supports the need for larger pipeline capacity to
constrained regions, such as New England, but does not present marginal impacts of
improved capacity or their interaction with other fundamentals explicitly. A more
detailed study specific to the New England region was prepared by Competative
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Energy Services (2014), which econometrically modeled daily demand but assumed
exogenous prices of the various supply sources (pipeline, LNG, other compressed gas
substitutes). The Department of Energy assessed the adequacy of capacity in the
Northeast region based on planned pipeline expansions and demand scenarios, but did
not consider prices, but rather if the capacity would meet “essential human needs” in
terms of quantity in disruption events (DOE 2013). The needs curiously do not include
the need for natural gas in electric power generation, but just residential and
commercial uses. The study finds that New England and New York City are
vulnerable to pipeline disruptions by their definitions.

While including pipeline capacity directly has, to my knowledge, not been included in
econometric estimates of New England’s regional natural gas prices or quantities, it is
often cited as a major driver in elevated prices for the region in recent winter months
(Evans-Brown 2014; Gellerman 2015; National Grid 2014; Ailworth 2014b). There is
theoretical and previous empirical justification for this hypothesis using economic
theories of congestion. Oliver et al. (2014) present a model of the price differential
between two hubs and the congestion of a connecting pipeline to motivate an
empirical analysis of a Rocky Mountain region pipeline that closely matches their
theoretical model. They find strong empirical support for the effect of congestion on
spot prices.

This paper will build on previous work modeling natural gas prices by including
relevant fundamental factors of weather, storage, and alternative fuels while adding
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and testing the addition of an indicator of pipeline capacity as an important
explanatory variable for a regional natural gas market. A description of the data is
followed by the econometric methods and results.

Data
The data for the study spans January 2002 to December 2014. Monthly data on natural
gas prices and consumption of each state by sector (electric, residential, commercial,
industrial) are from the EIA’s Natural Gas Monthly reports and obtained through the
online data portal. Oil and LNG prices were also obtained through the EIA.

There are multiple prices for natural gas, depending on the market of interest. The
city-gate price (Algonquin Citygate for New England) is the wholesale price of gas
received by local gas utilities from a pipeline operating company. The sector-specific
prices and consumption data comes from surveys reported from individual purchasers
and the prices reflect the total cost of the natural gas: the commodity as well as
delivery to the end-user (EIA 2015b). These sector prices reflect the type of
contractual arrangement that the buyers have with the pipeline or utility for residential,
commercial and industrial prices. So, although the Algonquin spot price is a general
indicator of the monthly cost of natural gas in the region, it does not reflect the actual
price paid by end users.

Pipeline capacity data by state and region is reported annually by the FERC (Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission), which is tasked with regulating pipeline use and
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construction. FERC also approves future projects and release a projection of capacity
based on announced or under construction additions and subtractions. Pipeline
capacity is represented in MMcf/d, million cubic feet per day. An estimate of pipeline
utilization for a month is the difference between total consumption for the month and
the maximum possible based on pipeline capacity. For example, for the year 2014 the
northeast states had a net import capacity of 120 bcf/month (billion cubic feet) and a
consumption of 98 bcf in January, but only 62 bcf in July. For non-firm contract
holders, the capacity remaining after firm demand is met reflects their time-varying
supply.

Total monthly consumption by sector is used to separate the firm contract demand
(local utilities for residential, commercial and industrial uses) from electric sector gas
consumption, which occurs under interruptible contracts. The difference between
pipeline capacity and firm demand determines the capacity leftover for the electric
sector. This is the capacity variation I use to identify the effect of a marginal increase
in capacity on the gas market for the electric energy generators. In essence, this would
assume price inelastic short-term demand from firm contract sectors. Exact monthly
utilization data reported from each pipeline operator and not gleaned from EIA
consumption data would be ideal, but it could not be obtained in a consistent manner
and is not made available through public reporting.

Previous studies have found strong relationships between the storage, or deviations
from normal storage, and the price of natural gas (Mu 2007; Nick & Thoenes 2013).
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Natural gas is stored in underground reserves in depleted oil and gas fields and in
places where the right geologic properties for storage naturally occur such as salt
caves and aquifers. The amount of gas in storage less the base gas needed to keep the
storage site operational is known as the site’s working gas reserves. The EIA reports
the quantity of gas stored by consuming region. This study uses working gas for the
eastern consuming region. The extent to which storage affects regional prices within
the context of other constraints will be tested in the SEM econometric specification.

Degree days are defined as the difference between the daily average temperature and
65°F. The monthly measure is the sum of the degree days for the month. Both heating
and cooling degree days are expressed as positive values. The idea is that cooling
demand is determined by how far above the temperature is from 65°F and the opposite
for heating. Degree days and differences from their long-run (1981-2010) averages, or
degree day anomalies, are strong explanatory variables for natural gas demand and
prices. This data comes from NOAA’s National Weather Service Degree Day
Statistics database, which provides population-weighted heating and cooling degree
days by month, state, and region (NOAA 2015).

Model
The economic system can be summarized by a system of simultaneous equations.
There is one equation for each endogenous variable and one identity. Assessing the
system in the structural form helps make clear the assumptions of the econometric
specifications.
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

The variables are defined as follows:

Table 1

Equation (1) is the natural gas demand equation for the electric energy generating
sector and equation (2) is the supply equation. Equation (3) is the firm contract natural
gas quantity consumed. Equation (4) represents working gas storage. Equation (5) is
the identity making explicit the estimate of capacity left for the electric sector being
the difference between firm contract consumption and total pipeline capacity.
Including

, the measure of capacity for the electric energy sector in the

econometric specifications, will test its importance in explaining price and quantity in
this market.
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The simultaneity between prices, quantities and working gas storage makes identifying
the structural parameters ( for exogenous and

for endogenous variables) difficult.

For example, to estimate a change in supply as a result of a change in price for natural
gas (

) using OLS, one would have to ensure that the variable for the price (

uncorrelated with the error term (

was

in that equation. Given that the quantity and

prices are simultaneous, the correlation is guaranteed. To see this, substitute
equation (2) into equation (1) and solve for

from

. This algebra involves dividing

equation (1), including the error term, through by a term including the parameter

,

after the substitution. Therefore, the error term is correlated with consumption,
violating an assumption of OLS leading to bias in the coefficient estimate (Murray
2005). Using OLS to estimate a structural parameter would be a biased representation
of the effect of prices on consumption as well as biasing other coefficients in the
regression. The same logic holds for the other coefficients on endogenous variables.

The reduced form equations, which represent endogenous variables only as a function
of exogenous variables (from each equation), can provide unbiased estimates of the
marginal effect of only exogenous regressors on the equilibrium price and quantity of
natural gas for the electric sector. The reduced form models can be seen as simplified
versions of the structural equation system with substitutions made for each
endogenous variable. The path of the effect, such as a shift in demand leading to a
change in price, is not identified with reduced form models. However, the reduced
form equations are sufficient to estimate the effect of exogenous variables on the
equilibrium values of endogenous variable to the system. They estimate changes in
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equilibrium values as a result of changes in an exogenous variable since the exogenous
variable may directly affect a number of endogenous variables simultaneously, which
in turn determine equilibrium values of endogenous variables. By excluding the
endogenous variables from each reduced form equation, but including exogenous
variables from each structural equation in each estimated reduced form equation, the
effect of the exogenous variables are captured, but their path through each endogenous
variable is not.

Taking an example of a change in temperature, an exogenous variable to the system,
the reduced form equations would estimate the marginal effect on the equilibrium
price and quantity for natural gas as a results of simultaneous shifts in both the
demand and supply curves due the change in temperature. Whereas, the marginal
effects estimated in the SEM model are interpreted as the marginal effect of a variable
assuming the other endogenous variables are held fixed. To estimate the corollary
equilibrium effects from the SEM model one has to multiply the indirect effects
(through changes in other structural equations) and add that to the direct effect from
the exogenous variable in the structural equation of interest. An overview and
explanation of the use of reduced form models in estimating equilibrium price and
quantities is covered in Murray (2005) and a full techincal explaination in Zellner
(1974). The primary interest of this study, the effect of a capacity expansion on
equilibrium price and quantity for natural gas for the electric sector can be addressed
with a reduced from equations of the system. Therefore, I estimated the following
reduced form equations:
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(6)

(7)

The capacity left for the electric sector,
assuming

and

, is exogenous to these two equations

do not belong in the equation for

, firm contract demand.

Essentially, this assumes firm demand and pipeline capacity are exogenous to the
natural gas price and quantity for the electric sector. As the equations are stated in the
structural form, there may be an indirect path from

, to

through working gas

reserves, possibly challenging this assumption. Put another way, if changes in working
gas reserves affect both firm and interruptible natural gas price supply and demand,
which both in turn affect changes in working gas reserves, the firm demand and
leftover capacity may be endogenous to equation (6) and (7) above. We will put this
path of effects aside for investigation in the estimation of the SEM model, which can
deal with this endogeneity.

In order to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the reduced form equations
above, a number of additional econometric issues need to be overcome. To meet the
assumptions needed of OLS to be unbiased and consistent, the error term must be
stationary, not correlated with its lags, and normally distributed. Stationarity refers to
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the property of mean, variance, and autocorrelation of a time series that is consistent
across time. Price and quantity time series are notoriously non-stationary.

Regressions between non-stationary variables may lead to spurious results if the two
variables happen to follow a similar random path across the observed time period
(even if the error term of a regression appears stationary). If this is the case, large
values of one series do correlate with large values of the others and vice-versa.
Running OLS would then assume, incorrectly, that the mean is constant which leads to
estimating relationships that are meaningless. Regressions between stationary and
non-stationary variables also lead to estimation issues, as the non-stationarity is then
passed on to the error term. Therefore, I ran tests for stationarity in the form of an
augmented Dickey Fuller test, which tests the presence of a unit root, or a coefficient
of 1 on a regression of a variable with the lag of itself. These are presented in Table 2.
Those variables where we fail to reject a unit root, implying non-stationarity, are
differenced and then re-tested for difference stationarity. The failure to reject a unit
root for oil prices and LNG prices implies these are non-stationary series.

The price variables and the measure of leftover capacity are included in natural log
form. Therefore, I am estimating a log-log model between those variables and a loglinear relationship between the variables left in levels. Both of these specifications
assume a non-linear underlying relationship. Oliver et al. (2014) find this sort of nonlinear relationship between the capacity constraint and the price differential between
pipeline nodes. How well this type of relationship describes the price and quantity data
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in the Northeast will depend on the behavior of the error term in the regression.
Namely, after variable transformations, the residuals from the regression should be
normally distributed. Using only non-logged data led to a non-normally distributed
error term and a fitted model that underestimated the price increases in constrained
months. The quantile plots of the residuals of both specifications are found in Figure 4
showing the residuals to be closer to normally distributed (the straight lines) using the
log transformations.

In each specification of the model using OLS, there exists month-to-month
autocorrelation in the residual, which would bias the estimates of the coefficient
standard errors. Although the inclusion of the degree-day variables captures much of
the seasonality in the relationships, there exists a remaining seasonal correlation
component of the error term. To overcome these two autocorrelation issues, I include a
seasonal lag of the dependent variable and handle the remaining autocorrelation
process using GLS (generalized least squares) using maximum likelihood estimation
methods. First, I present the OLS estimates with no consideration for non-stationary
variables followed by including them in differenced form. The preferred models, one
for price and one for quantity, are the furthest right in Tables 3 and 5.

GLS is well suited to handling time series data by modeling autocorrelation in the
residual in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients
for statistical inference of marginal effects. ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving
average) are closely related and are often used for near-term forecasting of economic
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time series. The method relies on past history of a time series to make prediction of
future values. Without the inclusion of exogenous regressors (ARIMAX in the
parlance of these models), the method is considers atheoretical, as there exists no
underlying theory as to why the series should behave in the way described (Hyndman
& Athanasopoulos 2013). With the inclusion of exogenous regressors, the models
become nearly equivalent to a GLS specification if the error lag structure is specified
similarly. In the end, both are estimated using distributional assumptions and
maximization of a log likelihood function to fit the parameters. Therefore as a
robustness check, I performed an ARIMA analysis. The marginal effect results are
similar, but the simulation predictions are slightly different due to how the error term
is treated in step ahead forecasting. The model and results from this analysis are in the
Appendix.

Reduce Form Results
Table 3 presents the results of the reduced form price regressions. Columns 1-4 show
the OLS results with additions of oil prices, the seasonal lag, and LNG prices. Column
5-6 shows the GLS estimates taking into account the remaining autocorrelation in the
OLS error term. I specified an ARMA (1,1) process based on comparing the AIC from
alternative model specifications for the residual autocorrelation. The resulting GLS
estimates show a well-behaved, stationary error term with no autocorrelation. The
same process was repeated for column 6, where the non-stationary regressors were
replaced with the differenced series.
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The results show a significant relationship between the pipeline capacity left for the
electric sector after taking into account firm demand and the price of gas for this
sector. The coefficient (-.48) means that an increase in capacity left of 1% lead to a
.48% decrease in price. The coefficient on degree day anomalies is significant and
positive. Degree day deviations remain in level form, so a 1 degree change in degree
day anomalies for a month leads to .06% increase in price.

The coefficients on heating and cooling degree days are insignificant. These are highly
correlated with the measure of leftover capacity, which is itself a function of degree
days through firm demand, equation (3). Including both raises issues of collinearity.
The coefficient correlation matrix reveals that the estimates of the coefficients of
HDD, and CDD are in fact correlated with the leftover capacity, our variable of
interest (correlations of .82 and .24 respectively). Specifications with combinations of
including temperature and capacity variables together and separately are in Table 4 as
robustness checks. One would expect collinearity to inflate standard errors of
coefficient on both variables, inflate t-values and thus I would fail to reject that
coefficients are different then zero more often. The significance of the coefficient on
leftover capacity in the model including both leftover capacity and temperature
measures remains strong. This means that it is to a larger extent the congestion that
drives the price electric generators pay. It also supports modeling the leftover capacity
once the firm demand is accounted for when estimating natural gas prices for the
electric sector.
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That degree day anomalies were significant and not degree days itself may be partly a
result of including a seasonal lag, which takes up much of the variation in monthly
average temperatures. It is the deviations from normal conditions that provide
explanation above and beyond the average monthly conditions. I left the working gas
reserve variable out of the regression due to the simultaneity issues. Thus, the
estimates of the effect of the temperature variables could be working through changes
in working gas as well as through other excluded endogenous variables in the reduced
form estimates. In order to separate those effects, one would have to estimate the
whole system of equations with identifying restrictions.

Table 5 shows the results for the reduced form equilibrium quantity estimates. The
coefficients are of the expected sign. The seasonal pattern of natural gas consumption
for electricity generation means more is consumed in the summer when prices are low
and demand is high and less is consumed in the winter with constrained capacity and
high prices (Figure 1). The positive and significant coefficient on CDD reflects the
summer cooling demand. Since the equation is in reduced form, the negative sign on
degree day anomalies may reflect the effect of the resultant increase in price that go
along with those conditions. Again, a system of equations with identifying restrictions
would be needed to disentangle these two effects. Lastly, our variable of interest,
leftover capacity is significant and positively related to the amount consumed by
electric energy generation.

Increase in Capacity Scenario Analysis
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The estimates of equilibrium price and quantity allows for estimating the effect of an
increase in pipeline capacity to the region. Holding other covariates constant, a 1%
increase in pipeline capacity would lead to .48% decrease in price and an increase in
consumption of .21%. Price and quantity series for a number of weather scenarios are
estimated as follows. The scenarios are assessed under current and future pipeline
capacities. To do so, first I estimate the leftover capacity as a function of the quantity
of gas consumed by firm contract holders, equation (5) in the system of equations
above. Again, I am assuming that the price and quantity consumed by the electric
energy sector is exogenous to the firm quantity demand
estimate this separately, as neither
capacity,

, or

. As a result, I can

appear in the equation for leftover

.

The regression results for estimating

are in Table 6. I use the same process as the

previous regressions. First, I fit the OLS model with the covariates, determine the
error structure of the residuals, and then re-estimate with GLS accounting for the error
structure (ARMA(2,1)). The model is a good fit with a small standard error (.12),
which is a 1.1% percent error. The difference between this estimate of firm demand
and the pipeline capacity, equation (5), creates the capacity left for the electric sector.

Based on current proposed expansion on the Algonquin and Tennessee pipelines, a
marginal increase in capacity of 450 MMcf/d, about an 11% increase in total capacity
into New England is currently planned (ICF International 2014). The expansion on the
Algonquin line is largely along existing routs and is comprised of increasing the
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diameter of the pipeline in certain sections as well as upgrading compressors stations
and adding a few auxiliary loops (FERC 2015). The Tennessee pipeline expansion
involves siting new routs from New York through western Massachusetts to the
greater Boston, MA area (Kinder Morgan 2015). Both projects are making their way
through the review and regulatory process and face opposition for their impacts on the
planned routs and the environmental implications of the fossil fuel energy (Ailworth
2014a; Jay Fitzgerald 2014; Zeller 2014; Marc Levy 2014). They are both slated to be
completed in 2016. While the timing and exact capacity of these particular project will
likely change over time, this study will use the 450 MMcf/d as the increase in pipeline
capacity for the scenarios and to estimate the effect under scenarios of winter weather.

To generate the weather scenarios, temperature series for a selection of years are made
from the temperature dataset. The degree day data from NOAA in this form goes back
to 1997. On the basis of cumulative HDD, the coldest winter was that of 2003/4,
followed closely by the winter of 2013/14. The winter of 2003/04 is used as the severe
cold scenario, 2008/09 the median and 2011/12 the low demand scenario. I simulate a
year window, for example from September 2003 to the end of August 2004, to capture
the path of the equilibrium price and quantity through a continuous winter. By
presenting a range of winter severities, the impact of the expansions is shown under a
range of possible weather conditions. The other exogenous covariates, oil prices and
LNG prices, neither of which exhibit seasonality, are held fixed at their averages, and
thus differenced to equal zero, for the scenarios. The lagged dependent variables,
natural gas prices for electric power generation and total consumption from all other
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sectors

are

the

2014

price

series.

Figure 5 and Tables 7 and 8 show the price and quantity projections for the winter
scenarios under the current and expanded pipeline capacities. The figures show price
in solid lines and quantity in dashed lines for both the current (black) and future (red)
capacity scenarios. Prices are the highest in January when the system is constrained by
high heating demand from firm contract holders, while the quantity consumed is
highest in the summer months when price is low and electric energy demand is high.
The severity of the winter increases the price spike as well as increasing the difference
between the two capacity scenarios. For the mild winter, there is a difference in price
of $1.16/Mcf in January, while under the severe winter scenario this increases to
$2.96/Mcf. The quantity projections are inversely related to the price. The increase in
capacity alleviates the congestion but is relatively more important in colder winters. In
terms of the difference in total expenditure (price times quantity) of natural gas
consumed by the electric sector, the increased capacity reduces overall total
expenditure in the electric sector by just over $35 million for the month of January
alone. This reflects the lower price and slightly increased quantity consumed. The
difference is $31 million under the median January and $15 million under the mild
scenario.

SEM Model
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The reduced form models are useful in estimating equilibrium price and quantity, but
have their drawbacks. I was unable to include working gas reserves, a possibly
important explanatory variable, directly due to endogeneity. The reduced form
coefficients are the total, direct plus indirect, effects between the variables in the
system. Thus, I may be attributing an effect to degree days, for instance, that is the
sum of degree day’s direct effect on demand as well as its indirect effect through
changes in working gas reserves, if working gas reserves effect supply or demand
directly. Additionally, the structural parameters describe the shape of the demand and
supply curve. Of particular interest are the price elasticities. Disentangling these
effects by estimating the structural parameters that describe the supply and demand
curve for natural gas in this market requires estimating the SEM model.

Simultaneous equation models are used to identify the path of effects of a change in an
exogenous variable on endogenous variables in the system. They are used to identify
the direct and indirect effects (through other endogenous variables) in order to infer
causality from one variable to another. For example, if the effect of increased capacity
shifted both the supply of natural gas, but also the storage, which may lead to a change
in equilibrium price, an SEM model could quantify what portion of the effect of the
change in capacity on prices was due to a change in storage versus a change in supply.
The reduced form model estimates only the total effect, thus I could not separate the
direct and indirect (through storage) effects. Therefore, for causal inference, which
relies on estimating the effect on one variable conditional on all other held constant,
SEMs are superior. A reduced form model does not assume all other variables are held
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constant and thus the estimated marginal effects are exposed to issues of indirect
causality explained above. This is important for estimating the shape of the demand or
supply curve, but not necessary for estimating changes in equilibrium values.
Equilibrium values are, by definition, the outcome of all the endogenous variables
changing simultaneously. Therefore, to identify the price elasticities of supply and
demand (shape of the curves), I use an SEM model. To estimate changes in
equilibrium values as a results of an expansion of capacity, I use a reduced form
model. Additionally, I compare the total effect from the SEM model to the reduced
form. Analytically these are the same, but the methods to estimate the equations are
slightly different.

I estimate the dynamic simultaneous equations model (SEM) of the system presented
earlier. I include the one-month lag of each endogenous variable as well as one
seasonal lag term to its respective equation to handle the time series nature of the data.
This was based on autocorrelation function plots of the residuals post estimation. After
the lags were added, there are no significant lags in the errors term from each
equation.

To identify the structural parameters, there needs to be included at least as many
exogenous variables as there are equations for endogenous variables in the system. I
use the temperature series, oil and LNG prices as well as the lags of each endogenous
variable as instruments in the 3SLS estimation of the system. Therefore, my model is
over-identified with 13 exogenous or predetermined variables, including the lags, to 4
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structural equations. The lagged endogenous variables are considered predetermined,
therefore not correlated with the current period’s error term and exogenous to the
current period (Fox 2002; Henningsen et al. 2007). In addition, a minimum of one
exogenous variable must be left out of each equation for identification. This is the
SEM version of the exclusion restriction in instrumental variable estimates. 12

The 3SLS results are presented in Table 9. Each column presents the results of the
structural equations described in the model. 3SLS combines 2SLS, the system of
equations version of instrumental variables, and SUR (seemingly unrelated
regression), which takes into account the remaining correlation between the error
terms across each equation and is estimated with generalized method of moments
(GMM). 3SLS is therefore more efficient then 2SLS. The null hypothesis of the
Hausman test is that the exogenous variables are uncorrelated with the errors term
from each equation. Under the null hypothesis both 2SLS and 3SLS are consistent,
while under the alternative hypothesis 2SLS is consistent while 3SLS is not. I am
unable to conduct a Hausman test due to computational issues in the R package
systemfit. Workarounds are currently being explored. In the meantime as a robustness
check, the 2SLS results are shown in Table 10. The 2SLS are less efficient but
unbiased in the case where the exogenous variables are correlated with the error terms.
The results are very close, showing similar magnitudes and significance in important
relationships although the price elasticity of demand is only significantly different than
zero at the 10% level.
12

Formally, The order condition (necessary for identification), as many exogenous variables as
endogenous variables in the system, is therefore satisfied. I also checked that the rank condition
(sufficient for identification) is also satisfied given the system specified.

126

The coefficients for heating degree days and degree day anomalies are positive and
significant in the demand equation, reflecting demand being driven by temperature.
The variable of interest, capacity for the electric sector, is significant in the supply
equation. An increase of capacity of one percent leads to an increase of .7% in
quantity supplied, capturing the shift in the supply curve. While the reduced form
regressions quantified the total effect on equilibrium price and quantity, the SEM
model made explicit the path of the effect, through shifts in the supply curve. The
price elasticity of demand is -.57 and significant. Thus the total effect of a 1% change
of capacity on equilibrium price, the multiplication of the indirect effects of capacity
on supply and quantity supplied on demand, is -.404%. This should be, and it is in this
case, close to the reduced form estimate. The advantage of the SEM is now I can
identify the path of the effect and the shape of the supply and demand curve. The
supply price elasticity is small, negative and significant, which is against what theory
would imply. However, very low and sometimes negative supply price elasticities for
natural gas, especially over the short run, have been found before, but are not common
(Arora 2014). The elasticity results show that both supply and demand are price
inelastic over this period. The inelastic demand and supply price elasticities means that
small excess supplies or demands are only cleared with a large change in price, which
helps explain the volatility of the price for natural gas, especially for interruptible
contract holders.
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Previous work has found changes in natural gas storage conditions to be significant in
describing price movements in reduced form models (Brown & Yücel 2008; Mu
2007), but by including them, each assumes that their measure of storage levels is
exogenous to the current price of natural gas. If this is not the case, the coefficients
from those regression results are biased. The inclusion of working gas reserves to the
SEM as an endogenous variable led to unexpected results. Changes in working gas
reserves was insignificant in explaining shifts in the supply curve but positively and
significantly related to demand. The results of the working gas structural equation are
also unexpected. Changes in reserves are positively related to electric energy
consumption of natural gas, which would naturally be a draw on reserves. Working
gas reserves are also, curiously, significantly positively related with both HDD and
CDD. The effect of degree day anomalies are negative and significant which may
reflect the difference from average storage conditions in times of particularly high
demand. The results raise more questions then answers for the effect of natural gas
storage in the market for the electric generating sector.

The way the variation in working gas explains the dynamics of this system appears to
be against what theory would imply. One would expect larger working gas reserves to
decrease price by increasing available supply. While I included demands and therefore
withdrawals on the reserves, explanatory variables for the variation in additions to
working gas storage from producers were not included and could be a direction of
future inquiry. Since the seasonal pattern is handled by the seasonal lagged term and
the temperature variables, variation in additions to storage above and beyond normal
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conditions is assumed to be random noise. The gas is being stored to meet
expectations of future demand, so if explanatory variables of storage additions are
correlated with already included variables to the system, the results could be biased.

Between the curious supply price elasticities and the results of the working gas
variable, I do not put much weight on the SEM results at this point other then to
reinforce that leftover capacity is a possibly significant driver of supply for this natural
gas consuming sector and that the system appears to be price inelastic. These low price
elasticities are understandable as supply is fixed with pipeline capacity and demand
the result of running large fixed capital.

Discussion
The results of the reduced form regressions show that capacity constraints are a driver
of the increase in the price of natural gas in cold winter months. The SEM results
support the case for including the capacity constraints as an explanatory variable of the
supply of gas to a constrained region such as New England.

Capacity additions represent a shift in the supply curve for natural gas, as identified
through the SEM results. The total effect (direct and indirect) of a 1% increase in
capacity of prices from the SEM results was similar, but slightly smaller, to that found
with the reduced form model, -.44 and -48% respectively. Analytically, these marginal
effects on equilibrium prices should be identical assuming the structural model is the
correct model of the system. The reduced form model is just a simplification of the
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structural model. However, the reduced form models are estimated with GLS using
maximum likelihood methods, while the 3SLS estimate with GMM. While both are
consistent, meaning they converge to the true value of a parameter they no not have
identical small sample properties. Additionally, the SEM model explicitly includes the
working gas reserves, which could provide a back-door rout for electric sector demand
to effect firm demand and thus challenge an assumption needed for the reduced form
models to be unbiased. This rout, working gas reserves effecting firm demand, is
insignificant in the SEM equations. The two approaches produced similar equilibrium
results, but the SEM model allowed for the identification of the shape of the supply
and demand curves.

To a large extent, the entire system is driven by temperature dependent demand, so
identifying the effect of the capacity constraint above and beyond the effect of the
temperature variation was always going to be a tall task. That the variable proposed in
this study to represent the leftover capacity for the non-firm contract holders remained
significant through many specifications, including ones with other correlated
covariates, supports the inclusion of this fundamental factor.

The inclusion of the capacity measure and its significance to explaining both price and
quantity provides a path to estimate the effect of increasing the capacity of pipelines
into New England. This study considers both equilibrium price and quantity changes
based on the marginal effects of constrained conditions through the study period.
Other approaches have estimated the effect of pipeline additions for New England
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(Competitive Energy Services 2014; DOE 2013; ICF International 2014) which either
assume price schedules or do not allow for feedbacks between price and quantity, or
only consider price not quantity or vice versa. Studies up until this point have left an
incomplete picture for the consequences for the electric energy sector. These results
quantify the effect when both supply and demand are taken into account to come to an
estimate of the change in total expenditure on natural gas by the electric energy
generators.

Temperature is a significant driver of price and quantity variations, which is in line
with studies of other natural gas markets (Mu 2007; Stephen P. A. Brown & Mike K.
Yucel 2008; Nick & Thoenes 2013). While quantities consumed reflect fundamental
demand factors, prices reflect scarcity and the extent to which conditions surprise
market participants. Large degree day anomalies capture conditions that are relatively
more rare and may misalign with market participants expectations of a month’s
conditions and drive up or down prices to a larger extent. I estimated the effect of
increased capacity under a range of winter severities. January, in particular, over the
study period led to constrained conditions and large price increases. Depending on the
severity of the winter month, the effect of the capacity additions of 450 MMcf/d in
terms of total expenditure bye the electric sector varies by over 100% (15 Million to
31 Million) for a single month. The non-linear relationship between temperature
conditions and the benefits of additional capacity makes using average conditions
misleading.

Considering the benefits under more severe winters, or with a
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probabilistically weighted expected benefit may provide directions moving forward to
estimate the benefits of additional pipeline capacity.

Given this non-linearity, pipeline capacity affects the range of prices, reducing the
winter spikes to a larger extent in abnormal conditions. Thus, pipeline capacity
reduces the price risk of energy supply for the region. However, excess capacity to
address winter constrained conditions will come as an additional cost in other times,
where the large fixed cost of the system are spread out over the smaller gas volumes
that are flowing. A weakness of the methods used in this study is that they do not
address directly the possible price changes due to the effect of larger fixed costs of
pipeline operation. To what extent the firm demand or interruptible customers share
the burden of the increased fixed cost is unclear.

The objective of this paper was to estimate changes in equilibrium prices and
quantities of natural gas consumed by the electric sector as the results of a change in
pipeline capacity. It is the equilibrium prices for natural gas that describe the per-unit
cost of the input to electric generation. These costs are passed along to electric
ratepayers. Thus, to estimate the effect of increased capacity on ratepayers, and inform
the debate about how the cost of electric energy might change, a reduced form model
is well suited. Translating the price for gas that natural gas generators pay to the cost
of electric energy to residents and businesses is left for future work. The SEM results
clear up the causal mechanism, a shift in supply, and confirm a similar total effect as
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from the reduced form models. In addition, the SEM model shows that both the supply
and demand curves are price inelastic.

This study provides one piece of the puzzle in determining the effects of proposed
expansions, but not the whole picture. In the debate about the impact of proposed
pipelines, this study offers a way to quantify the effect on the electric energy
generators input price and quantity for natural gas. The benefits to the electric energy
sector are potentially large by allowing larger quantities of gas to be consumed at
lower price for generation. These benefits should be weighed against the costs of the
planned routs, the environmental consequences, natural gas price in other sectors and
other indirect benefits and costs.
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Tables and Figures

Symbol

CDD

TABLE 1
Variable Definitions
Name
NG price for electric sector
NG quantity for electric sector
NG capacity for electric sector
NG consumed by other sectors
Working gas reserves
Heating degree days
Cooling degree days
Degree day anomaly
WTI oil price
LNG import price
New England pipeline capacity

Units
$

Exogenous

MMcf
MMcf
MMcf
MMcf
°F
°F
°F

x
x
x

$
$
MMcf

x
x
x

Note: Price, consumption and capacity data are from the EIA’s Natural Gas Monthly.
Degree day data are from NOAA’s National Weather Service Degree Day Statistics
database. The last column indicates the assumptions of erogeneity of the variables to the
system for identification.
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TABLE 2
Unit Root Tests
Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Levels
Differences
**
NG price for electric -3.6283
Leftover capacity
-5.49***
Degree days
-17.61***
Degree day diff
-5.09***
Oil price
-2.36
-5.9732***
Working gas diff
-3.33*
-5.1506***
Working gas
-7.57***
LNG price
-2.53
-5.6432***
*
p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<0.01
Note: The test statistic for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test of a unit root is presented for both the level data as well
as the differenced data. The null hypothesis of a unit root,
implying non-stationary is rejected with significant test
statistics. Variables are in levels or first differences.
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TABLE 3
Equilibrium Natural Gas Price
New England Electric Sector
Dependent variable:
Log NG Price Electric
OLS
(1)
Log NG Capacity
0.030
(0.201)
HDD
0.00048***
(0.0002)
CDD
0.00058
(0.001)
DDd
0.00121***
(0.0004)
Log Oil Price

(2)
-0.586**
(0.235)
0.00010
(0.0002)
0.00013
(0.001)
0.00128***
(0.0004)
0.356***
(0.081)

Seasonal Lag

(3)
-0.979***
(0.214)
-0.00026
(0.0002)
0.00003
(0.001)
0.00103***
(0.0004)
0.191**
(0.080)
0.406***
(0.070)

Log LNG Price

(4)
-0.595***
(0.176)
-0.00004
(0.0001)
0.00023
(0.0004)
0.00066**
(0.0003)
0.017
(0.067)
0.239***
(0.059)
0.629***
(0.071)

GLS
(5)
-0.563***
(0.187)
0.00001
(0.0001)
0.00021
(0.0003)
0.00060***
(0.0002)
0.171
(0.139)
0.301***
(0.076)
0.123**
(0.061)

Δ Log Oil Price

F Statistic

156
0.209
0.188

0.386 (df =
151)
9.985***
(df = 4;
151)

156
0.300
0.277

144
0.427
0.401

144
0.638
0.620

0.280***
(0.080)

144

0.060
(0.163)
0.003
(0.004)
144

46.593
-71.185

45.653
-69.306

-38.594

-36.638

Δ LNG Price
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf.
Crit.
Residual Std.
Error

(6)
-0.479**
(0.186)
0.00005
(0.0001)
0.00028
(0.0003)
0.00058***
(0.0002)

0.364 (df
0.318 (df =
0.255 (df =
= 150)
137)
135)
12.883***
***
16.988 (df 34.049*** (df
(df = 5;
= 6; 137)
= 7; 135)
150)
*
**
***
p<.10 p<.05 p<0.01

Note: Each column represents a different specification of the model explaining natural gas prices paid
by the electric energy sector. The last 2 columns are from GLS regressions with ARMA(1,1) errors
specified based on the residuals of the OLS regression. Observation lengths differ to the inclusion of a
seasonal lag. Oil and LNG prices are in first differences in the last column due to non-stationarity
issues.
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TABLE 4
Test of Treatment of Temperature Variables
Equilibrium Natural Gas Price for New England Electric Sector
Dependent variable:
Log NG Price Electric
(1)
Log NG Capacity

(2)

(4)
**

0.00038***
(0.00009)
0.00051*
(0.00029)
0.00048***
(0.00018)

HDD
CDD
DDd

(3)

0.00079***
(0.00016)

-0.47868
(0.18643)
0.00005
(0.00014)
0.00028
(0.00029)
0.00058***
(0.00019)

(5)
***

-0.56018
(0.10376)

0.00065***
(0.00017)

0.02876***
(0.00884)

0.00055***
(0.00019)
0.00091
(0.00063)
0.02826***
(0.00894)

0.06945
(0.16083)
144
23.793
-29.586

0.01851
(0.16679)
144
2.970
18.060

HDDd
CDDd
Seasonal Lag

0.03009***
(0.00913)

0.02609***
(0.00898)

Δ Log Oil Price
Δ LNG Price
Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf.
Crit.

0.10587
(0.15612)
144
13.718
-11.436
12.040

0.04734
(0.16058)
144
6.764
6.473

0.28047***
(0.07951)
0.05992
(0.16323)
144
9.250
3.501

-0.50246***
(0.18817)
0.00008
(0.00014)
0.00024
(0.00035)

35.673
35.540
-3.241
52.923
p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<0.01
Note: GLS regressions of variations of the preferred natural gas price model are presented.
Column 3 is the preferred model, column 6 in Table 3. The measure of capacity for the electric
energy sector remains significant through alternative specifications of the model with
combinations of correlated temperature variables
*
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TABLE 5
Equilibrium Natural Gas Quantity
New England Electric Sector
Dependent variable:
Log NG Quantity for Electric
OLS
(1)
Log NG Capacity
0.522***
(0.072)
HDD
0.00019***
(0.0001)
CDD
0.00178***
(0.0002)
DDd
-0.00016
(0.0002)
Log Oil Price

(2)
0.443***
(0.094)
0.00014*
(0.0001)
0.00172***
(0.0002)
-0.00017
(0.0002)
0.040
(0.030)

Seasonal Lag

(3)
0.293***
(0.079)
0.00009
(0.0001)
0.00143***
(0.0002)
-0.00028**
(0.0001)
-0.057*
(0.030)
0.293***
(0.064)

Log LNG Price

(4)
0.266***
(0.078)
0.00008
(0.0001)
0.00141***
(0.0002)
-0.00021
(0.0001)
-0.021
(0.032)
0.286***
(0.063)
-0.085***
(0.030)

GLS
(5)
0.268***
(0.097)
0.00006
(0.0001)
0.00139***
(0.0002)
-0.00018
(0.0001)
-0.045
(0.046)
0.211***
(0.065)
-0.011
(0.036)

Δ Log Oil Price

F Statistic

168
0.607
0.597

0.151 (df =
163)
62.860***
(df = 4;
163)

168
0.611
0.599

156
0.695
0.683

155
0.710
0.696

0.193***
(0.062)

155

-0.165
(0.102)
0.005
(0.003)
156

135.010
-246.020

137.551
-251.101

-209.499

-214.503

Δ LNG Price
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf.
Crit.
Residual Std.
Error

(6)
0.214**
(0.090)
0.00003
(0.0001)
0.00143***
(0.0002)
-0.00018
(0.0001)

0.151 (df
0.122 (df =
0.119 (df =
= 162)
149)
147)
50.868***
***
56.584 (df 51.371*** (df
(df = 5;
= 6; 149)
= 7; 147)
162)
*
**
***
p<.10 p<.05 p<0.01

Note: Each column represents a different specification of the model explaining natural gas quantity
consumed by the electric sector. The last 2 columns are from GLS regressions with ARMA(2,1) errors
specified based on the residuals of the OLS regression. Observation lengths differ due to the inclusion
of a seasonal lag. Oil and LNG prices are in first differences in the last column due to non-stationarity
issues.
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TABLE 6
Estimate of Natural Gas Quantity
New England Firm Contract Quantity
Dependent variable:
Firm Contract Quantity Consumed
OLS

GLS

HDD

(1)
0.00120***

(2)
0.00039***

(3)
0.00051***

CDD

(0.00004)
-0.00008

(0.0001)
-0.00016

(0.0001)
-0.00007

DDd

(0.0003)
-0.00028

(0.0002)
0.00043***

(0.0001)
0.00017

Δ Log Oil Price

(0.0002)
0.106

(0.0001)
-0.123

(0.0001)
-0.150*

(0.157)

(0.115)

(0.088)

***

0.590***

(0.056)

(0.058)

Δ Log LNG Price

0.694

Seasonal Lag
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

***

0.59027***

(0.05569)
156
0.955
0.953

(0.05819)
156

0.69370
167
0.905
0.902

0.171 (df = 161)
0.120 (df = 149)
308.309*** (df = 5;
523.714*** (df = 6;
161)
149)
*
p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<0.01

158.531
-297.063
-266.564
0.13 (df=149)

Note: Models for the firm contract quantity consumed are presented in each column.
The GLS regression specifies a ARMA(2,0) errors based on minimizing AIC from
alternate lag specifications. The results are used to estimate the leftover natural gas
capacity for the electric sector. The simulation uses these fitted firm quantity
estimates to create the capacity left
for the electric sector.
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TABLE 7
Equilibrium Natural Gas Price Under Increased Capacity Scenarios
New England Electric Sector
Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

9
4.84
4.6
-0.24

-112
5.16
4.89
-0.27

46
6.64
6.19
-0.45

-147
7.66
7.04
-0.62

-95
11.07
9.91
-1.16

-27
7.96
7.25
-0.71

3
7.1
6.51
-0.59

-7
5.76
5.4
-0.36

-10
5.25
4.97
-0.28

48
5.37
5.1
-0.27

126
5.41
5.15
-0.26

-31
4.81
4.58
-0.23

Median Winter
DDd
19
4.88
Current
+450MMcf/d 4.64
Difference
-0.24

24
5.7
5.39
-0.31

31
6.56
6.12
-0.44

-30
8.63
7.87
-0.76

171
16.15
13.75
-2.40

-31
7.92
7.22
-0.70

26
7.26
6.66
-0.60

-62
5.52
5.18
-0.34

-15
5.22
4.94
-0.28

10
5.16
4.9
-0.26

-43
4.65
4.42
-0.23

58
5.19
4.94
-0.25

Severe Winter
DDd
Current
+450MMcf/d
Difference

17
5.67
5.37
-0.3

41
6.61
6.17
-0.44

-48
8.47
7.73
-0.74

228
17.9
14.94
-2.96

-41
7.94
7.23
-0.71

-38
6.82
6.27
-0.55

-50
5.57
5.22
-0.35

-37
5.14
4.87
-0.27

4
5.16
4.91
-0.25

-20
4.77
4.54
-0.23

-14
4.89
4.65
-0.24

Mild Winter
DDd
Current
+450MMcf/d
Difference

144

-69
4.57
4.34
-0.23

Note: Prices are differences in $/Mcf. Scenarios based on the regression results from column six of Table 3. The winter scenarios present a range of severities of
winters. Price is highest in January. The effect of increased capacity is largest in more severe winters.

TABLE 8
Equilibrium Natural Gas Quantities Under Increased Capacity Scenarios
New England Electric Sector
Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

9
32799
33546
747

-112
29920
30643
723

46
27152
27995
844

-147
27169
28198
1029

-95
24050
25246
1196

-27
25628
26698
1071

3
26548
27570
1022

-7
28995
29822
828

-10
30482
31218
736

48
37221
38056
835

126
47576
48631
1054

-31
36069
36868
799

Median Winter
DDd
19
33071
Current
+450MMcf/d 33825
Difference
753

24
29180
29904
724

31
27248
28090
841

-30
26206
27288
1082

171
21134
22683
1549

-31
25661
26730
1069

26
26364
27396
1032

-62
29641
30470
829

-15
29861
30583
722

10
33384
34136
752

-43
36885
37702
817

58
39872
40758
885

Severe Winter
DDd
-69
32212
Current
+450MMcf/d 32940
Difference
728

17
29218
29942
724

41
27184
28027
843

-48
26358
27431
1073

228
20359
22042
1683

-41
25651
26733
1082

-38
26872
27878
1006

-50
29307
30132
825

-37
30153
30878
726

4
34775
35555
780

-20
39560
40434
875

-14
37108
37930
822

Mild Winter
DDd
Current
+450MMcf/d
Difference

145

Note: Consumption and differences is in MMcf. Scenarios based on the regression results from column six of Table 5. The winter scenarios present a range of
severities of winters.

TABLE 9
New England Market for Natural Gas for the Electric Sector
3SLS SEM Estimates
NG Demand
Equation

NG Supply
Equation

NG quantity
consumed -0.567**

NG for electric
price

(0.230)
HDD

.00018**

DDd

Δ Log Oil
Price

44.967***

(0.032)

(2.076)
CDD

40.174***

Firm Quantity

-0.000069***
(0.00001)

Quantity Electric

.000016**

(0.290)

(5.868)

0.0004** DDd

-14.350***

(-0.0005)

(0.0002)

(4.674)

0.00072** CDD

.0018***

(-0.0002)

(0.0002)

(2,617.112)

Δ Log LNG
-.000061 Price

13.463

(0.0001)

(103.250)

(0.0003)

9,539.078*** R-squared

0.60

(1,283.210)

N

144

R-squared

0.97

DF

137

(0.004)

N

144

-0.071

DF

134

.0011*

0.057

HDD

DDd

(0.190)
Working
Gas

Working Gas

-0.121*** HDD

Log NG Capacity 0.713**

(-0.0001)
CDD

Firm Quantity

0.221***

Δ Log Oil Price -0.112

(0.048)
R-squared

0.80

N

144

DF

133

Δ Log Oil Price -566.816

Working Gas

(0.111)
Δ Log LNG Price 0.006

Working Gas

(-0.00001)
0.003***

HDD

(0.0003)
0.002***

CDD

(0.001)
-0.001***

DDd

System

(0.050)
R-squared

0.73

R-Squared

0.97

N

144

N

576

DF

132

DF

536

Note: Each column presents the results of the 3SLS estimates of each structural equation. Time trends, seasonal and one
period lags are included of each endogenous variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<0.01
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TABLE 10
New England Market for Natural Gas for the Electric Sector
2SLS SEM Estimates
NG Demand
Equation
NG quantity
consumed

NG Supply
Equation
-0.419*

NG for electric
price

(0.236)
HDD

0.0002***

0.001

Log NG
Capacity

0.001***

HDD

0.121

CDD

DDd

0.80

N

144

DF

133

0.0004*

0.002***

-0.0001

Δ Log Oil Price

-0.124

DDd

Working Gas

Firm Quantity -0.00005***

38.037***

(0.00001)
Quantity
Electric

-0.672

Δ Log Oil Price

-285.735

HDD

75.274

CDD

-966.776

DDd

-0.001***
(0.0003)

R-squared

0.75

(1,771.276)

N

144

DF

137

0.009*

R-squared

0.97

(0.005)

N

144

-0.073

DF

134

(0.052)

0.0005
(0.001)

(141.149)
Working Gas

0.002***
(0.0004)

(3,563.617)
Δ Log LNG Price

0.00003***
(0.00001)

(5.277)

(0.111)
Δ Log LNG
Price

38.384***

(5.942)

(0.0001)

(0.049)
R-squared

CDD

(0.0003)

(0.193)
Working Gas 0.238***

0.602**

Working Gas

(2.728)

(0.0002)

(0.0002)
Δ Log Oil
Price

HDD

(0.305)

(0.001)
DDd

-0.113***
(0.034)

(0.0001)
CDD

Firm Quantity

System

R-squared

0.77

R-Squared

0.97

N

144

N

576

DF

132

DF

536

Note: Each column presents the results of the 2SLS estimates of each structural equation. Time trends, seasonal and one
period lags are included of each endogenous variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<0.01
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FIGURE 1
Natural Gas Consumption by Sector
New England

148
Note: Data is from the EIA. Residential, commercial and industrial uses increase in the winter due
to heating requirements, while electric energy uses peak in the summer due to cooling demand.

FIGURE 2
Electric Energy Generation by Fuel Source
New England

149
Note: Data is from ISO-NE and represents the total GWh from each source for the year. Natural
gas generators have replaced retiring coal plants. Total consumption has remained mostly
constant.

FIGURE 3
Natural Gas Price by Consuming Sector
New England

150
Note: The price data is from surveys conducted by the EIA and accessed through the EIA’s data portal.
Each sector’s price is the per unit price of natural gas including delivery. Residential, industrial and
commercial prices follow a different path based on the structure of the local utilities. The electric sector
operates under interruptible contracts, which leads to increases in times of pipeline constraint.

FIGURE 4
Log Transformation Q-Q Plot Test
Preferred model
Level Model

Log Transformed Model

Note- This figure shows the quintile plot of the residuals from the preferred price
model, column 6 in Table 3, when specifications with the dependent and
independent variables are in levels compared to in logs. The temperature
variables remain in levels in both models. The log transformations create errors
that are closer to normally distributed, the strait lines in the plots.
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FIGURE 5
Simulation of Equilibrium Price and Quantity
New England Electric Sector
Mild

Median

Severe

Note: Price and quantity projections of an increase in 450 MMcf/d of
pipeline capacity. Each plot represents a different winter weather scenario.
Price is in solid lines and quantity in dashed lines for both the current
(black) and future (red) capacity scenarios.
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MANUSCRIPT 2 APPENDIX
Derivation of Equation 1
The area of a circle representing the irrigated agriculture acreage above the aquifer.
With a fixed initial aquifer area and maximum depth, we can relate geometry of the
aquifer to the radius of the irrigated acreage

Using these two, we get irrigated area as a function of the groundwater height and
geometry of the aquifer.

With the initial conditional known, we can solve for initial radius and

:

With these we can come to equation (1) in the paper by making at a percent of the initial
aquifer area:

Discussion of Equation 8
Here we want to illuminate the model dynamics of including a cone and uniform spatial
depletion of the groundwater resource. The speed of depletion is important in the model
and is determined by the irrigated area and thus a function of the height of groundwater;
therefore we compare the speed of height change in our model to the speed of height
change in a bathtub model.
Proposition 1:
given the same demand for water and a decreasing path of
groundwater height. The change in groundwater height is larger in the bathtub model
than in the spatial depletion model.
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We start with defining per acre water demand constant to give a fair comparison between
models

where
is the per acre water demand in the bathtub and spatial depletion model at a
given height defined by the price of water P. The total amount of water extracted is a
function of the height of the water as is the change in groundwater height. The total
water extracted decreases in the spatial model because there are less irrigated acres as the
height of groundwater decreases. This is realized through the spatial depletion function
or equation (1) in the main text. The rate at which groundwater height changes,
the equation of flow, is also a function of
.
refers to the spatial depletion model
and
refers to the bathtub model.

and

Equation (4a) describes how the percent of irrigated area of the of the spatial depletion
model changes. Increase in height cause an increase in irrigable area, and a decrease in
height causes a decrease in irrigable area at this rate described in in (4a). Taking a
difference in equation (2a) and (3a) we find

Equations (6a) and (7a) state that as the aquifer is depleted the change in height is less in
the spatial the depletion model at the rate given in equation (4a) and because the spatial
component becomes smaller and is in the denominator of equation (2a) the recharge acts
as a buffer to loss in height in the spatial depletion model. As the depletion parameter, ,
gets closer to one the difference converges to zero. As decreases so does , which
drives the differential to be positive.
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Proposition 2:
when there is compaction of the aquifer which reduces storage
in the spatial depletion model under the same per acre water demand.
A special case of equation (2a) is when total recharge decreases as the height declines,
this could be the case when subsidence occurs which shuts out storage to the aquifer
(Scanlon et al. 2012). If recharge is scaled to the remaining irrigable acreage to reflect
this subsidence and loss in storage which we define as

The equation flows are equal under the same demand curve.

Scanlon, Bridget R., et al. "Groundwater depletion and sustainability of irrigation in the
US High Plains and Central Valley." Proceedings of the national academy of
sciences 109.24 (2012): 9320-9325.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1
Welfare Gains to Management as a function of farming intensity
Stochastic Scenario
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NOTE- Welfare gains from management are sensitive to the assumption of
farming intensity which defines demand for groundwater and its marginal
value. As farming intensity is increased so to are the estimated gains to
management.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
Welfare Gains From Groundwater Management
Stochastic Rainfall Scenario
Total Discounted Profit (Billion $)

Stochastic - Spatial
Depletion
Stochastic - No Backstop
Stochastic - Bathtub Model

Perfect
Competition
$ 6.589
(.0937)
$ 6.021
(.0623)
$ 8.297
(.0063)

Optimal Policy

Difference

% Gain

$ 6.785
(.0938)
$ 6.335
(.0670)
$ 8.302
(.0054)

$ .196
(.006)
$ .313
(.006)
$ .0052
(.0015)

2.97
(.04)
5.20
(.06)
0.06
(.02)

NOTE- Standard errors of the stochastic figures from 100 iterations through rainfall realizations are in
parentheses. The deterministic scenario assumes average annual rainfall each year. Stochastic assumes i.i.d.
random draws from high, medium, low rainfall state based on empirical probabilities. The bathtub model
assumes no loss in irrigated land as groundwater levels fall. The no backstop scenario assumes that as
irrigated land falls, no farming at all occurs on acreage that no longer has access to the aquifer.
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MANUSCRIPT 3 APPENDIX
ARIMA Reduced Form Model
The I in ARIMAX stands for the level of integration, or how many times the dependent
variable must be differenced to be stationary. Using the stationary series, having first
differenced the non-stationary variables, an ARMAX of the following form is estimated.

Where
is the lagged, period, dependent variable with coefficients . Seasonal
lags enter in the same manner, but lagged 12 periods on our model. These terms handle
the autoregressive, ARp, process.
are coefficients on the moving average, MAq,
process on pervious residuals of a lag length . X is a matrix of exogenous regressors
with coefficient estimates . The appropriate length of the lag is a choice of the modeler,
but can be guided by evaluating the autocorrelation correlation function (ACF) and
partial autocorrelation function (PACF). From there it is common to use measures of AIC
and BIC can determine the most appropriate lag lengths.
I estimate the reduced form equations for both price and quantity based on the criteria
described above, which turned out to be the lag structures found in the OLS residuals and
specified in the GLS regressions from Table 3 and 5. The price equation is of the form
ARIMAX(1,0,0)(1,0,0)12 and the quantity equation of the form ARIMAX(2,0,0)(1,0,0)12,
where ARIMAX(p,d,q)(P,D,Q)m. The second set of parentheses specifies the seasonal
terms. M is the seasonal period lag. The results are presented in Table 8.
The results are similar to that found in the GLS regressions with an increase in leftover
capacity effecting prices negatively. The coefficient is larger in magnitude, implying a
1% change in capacity leading to a .6% change in price. Degree day anomalies are
significant and of similar magnitude. The quantity equation similarly shows a larger
effect of the leftover capacity on the equilibrium quantity consumed.
The results confirm the results of the GLS regressions. A benefit of the ARIMAX models
is that predictions can be made that take into account the time series of the error structure,
as opposed the GLS results, which use the unbiased estimates of the coefficients to
estimate values, but does not take into account the recent error term innovations in
making step ahead forecasts. Therefore, once values for the exogenous regressors are
provided, future values can be assessed under both current and increased capacity.
Similarly to the policy simulations above, first I estimate the firm demand, using an
ARIMAX model, calculate the remaining capacity and estimate the price and quantity for
electric energy generation equations. I estimate 2 years ahead, with the time series of the
severe winter scenario. The results are in Figure 6.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1
Natural Gas Price and Quantity for Electric Energy Generation
ARMAX Models

Dependent variable:
NG Electric Price
Model Type
Log NG Capacity
HDD
CDD
DDd
Δ Log Oil Price
Δ LNG Price
AR1 Lag
Seasonal Lag
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

NG Electric Quantity

ARIMAX(1,0,0)(1,0,0)12 ARIMAX(2,0,0)(1,0,0)12
-0.60164***
(0.19503)
0.00004
(0.00021)
0.00031
(0.00035)
0.00051**
(0.00020)
0.04783
(0.15305)
0.00524

0.29561**
(0.12055)
0.00006
(0.00012)
0.00161***
(0.00024)
-0.00006
(0.00015)
-0.19237*
(0.10412)
0.00584*

(0.00427)

(0.00306)

***

0.88330
(0.03803)
0.28594***
(0.08417)

0.63403***
(0.06562)
0.30880***
(0.09055)

48.69
-76.07
-45.44

129.07
-238.14
-206.21

* ** ***

p p p<0.01
Note: Reduced from equation of the natural gas price and quantity for
the electric energy generating sector are presented. The lag structure is
based on minimizing AIC with the inclusion of the exogenous covariates
and a 12-month seasonal lag.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 2
Natural Gas Prices for Electric Energy Generation
Equilibrium Price and Quantity
ARIMAX Models
Price

Quantity

Note: Price and Quantity projections from the ARIMAX model in
Table 8. Months count ahead from January, 2015 to December 2017.
The red line represents an increase of 450 MMcf/d of pipeline capacity
added at the stat of 2016, or 12 months ahead in the figure. The
increased capacity leads to lower prices and higher quantity consumed.
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